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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter will introduce the objective of the research and the importance of studying 
human factor in decision making and particularly the concepts of psychological traps. Then, it 
will be discussed the research gap and the academic and managerial contributions of such 
research. Lastly, in the final part it will be illustrated the research framework. 
 
1.1 Research focus and objective  
This study aims to demonstrate the manifestation of psychological traps in which middle 
managers are subjected. The underlying task is to provide an explicit indication of why 
professionals are prevented to act ethically and consequently to reach proper moral judgments. 
The latter elements will be used to form techniques and tools to consistent ethical outcomes 
and to a stronger organizational ethos. Therefore, the objective of this research is: 
 To apply concepts of psychological traps to situations of ethical choice of middle managers, 
to reveal potential causes of unethical decisions and to provide recommendations to avoid 
these mistakes.  
 
 After a wave of corporate scandals, since Enron unethical choices, questions of ethics 
have taken on significant urgency. The adoption of strict corporate ethics and codes of conduct 
became an unavoidable feature of each company.  However, the condemnations and the outrage 
continued as a result of managerial unethical decision making processes (Fombrun & Foss, 
2004; Sears, 2006). Why ethical lapses are still so frequent in managerial decisions?  
Human brain is not the rational machine that individuals tend to imagine. Series of flaws, 
in the way that people think, have been identified by researchers, posing several questions 
regarding the misconceptions, the biases or irrational anomalies in the way that individuals 
process and recognize psychological traps (Hammond, Keeney, & Raiffa, 2006). These 
ingrained flaws, shortcuts, biases or even bad habits can be a deceptive manner for rational 
decision making (Carter, 2013). Behavioral economics present exactly this argument that any 
kind of decision, that involves a bit of risk, is exposed to human biases (D. P. Lovallo & Sibony, 
2006). Insights from behavioral studies on the business environment explain that a common 
flaw - like the ones that are examined in this study - can lead to wrong conclusions or even 
increase the possibility of betting on bad decision (D. Lovallo & Sibony, 2010).  
It is important to note that the research on management focuses solely on the organizational 
and the contextual aspects, while neglecting the errors that can result from cognitive biases of 
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individual behavior. This orientation has led to a shortcoming in our understanding of various 
behavioral constructs (including ethical decision making).  The latter gap has led scholars to 
call for a broader view of the “conceptual toolkit” in order to expand the scope of cognitive 
imperfections that derive from psychological traps (Ariely, 2008).  
Therefore, this thesis moves beyond the dominant rational framework in which scholars 
have been focusing by examining the harmful effect of psychological traps and biases on 
managerial decision making and particularly on ethical terms.  
Furthermore, studies, both quantitative and qualitative, that focus on the ethical dimension 
of managerial decision making have exclusively considered on few factors: awareness, 
judgement, intention or intuition (M. S. Schwartz, 2016). Apart from other variables and 
factors, this steam of work discarded the possibility that managerial ethical decision making 
can be influenced by psychological traps. Therefore, this present study: 
 adds a new line of enquiry on the dependent variables of managerial ethical decision 
making by investigating the manifestations of psychological traps on the processes of ethically 
inconsistent decisions.  
Lastly, in order to investigate the effect, the research considers the decision making 
processes of mid-level professional in various business areas (freight forwarders, brokers/ 
specialist suppliers, Insurance/Airlines, Luxury/Consulting and Health clubs) and on five 
different regional clusters (Italy, UK-Spain, France/Venezuela, Brazil and Greece). 
 
1.2 Research gaps and contribution  
This master thesis contributes to the field of behavioral and business ethics, particularly 
into the topic of behavioral traps and unethical reactions, and provides practical contribution 
to the managerial community.  
Ariely (2008) have attempted to broaden the milieu in which hidden traps and irrationality 
are studied, but no further development regarding unethical decision making have taken place, 
particularly on mid-level management. Moreover, studies on ethical decisions are based on 
philosophical principles or on sorting wrong and right decisions to create a framework for the 
best possible ethical action. 
In addition, researches use managerial decision making as a theoretical hook without 
actually examining the antecedents, the consequences that may be irrational and not fixed or 
the dynamics of hidden traps in business ethics. One of the major concerns in management is 
to identify these key factors that can lead to irrational and unethical decision making. Decisions 
that can destroy businesses and careers, that are sometimes irreparable (Hammond et al., 2006).  
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To summarize the essential question is to: understand how middle managers move in 
unethical decisions? 
Hence, the gap of research is the emphasis on the root causes of unethical reactions – 
psychological traps and the dynamics of them. The study addresses the latter gap and develops 
a new approach that combines psychological variables and ethical variables. 
Considering these causes this research is essential for the following reasons: 
i. First, to demonstrate that regardless the growing body of research, that studied 
the concept of managerial ethical decision making, few have looked at the 
internal stimuli that compel managers to failures.  
ii. Second, to highlight the dynamic of psychological traps in relation to unethical 
reactions.  
iii. Lastly, to identify the most relevant biases that mid-level managers face in a 
corporation and understand the errors that can occur. 
According to D. P. Lovallo & Sibony (2006) should be comprehended that companies 
cannot afford to ignore the human factor regarding decision making. Managers are more 
constrained by existing cognitive biases that can mislead them in their decisions making 
process. Thus, of interest to practitioners and executives will be the differential effect of the 
traps on the latitude of actions and behaviors for middle managers. This may be of particular 
interest to corporations that wish to change their processes and their organizational routines 
and culture debate. Hence, the outlook of this research might support middle managers and 
executives: 
a. to objectify their understanding of what is happening to them 
b. to compel managers to be more cautious and vigilant 
c. to desensitize the process of decision making 
d. to introduce techniques that can emotionally habituate managers to this type of 
anxiety  
e. and to suggest tools that can shape a productive decision making culture 
 
1.3 Research framework 
One of the most vital elements for any research is the ability to establish a direct and clear 
relationship between the theory and the exploratory analysis that is employed to better 
understand and distinct the new theoretical challenges (Boyatzis, 1998). Therefore, the 
framework adopted in this research is of a central importance as it illustrates how the core 
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components are theoretically and systematically related to each other and to one another in the 
aim to establish an evident link to theory. This framework is described in figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1. Research Framework 
Theory 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Exploration of the extant literature and 
the identification of the research 
opportunities. Showing the gap in the 
existing literature on psychological 
trap, middle managers decision making 
and ethical decision making. 
 Theoretical Propositions 
Chapter 3: Developing the research model 
Development of the research mode and specific 
linkages that relate the antecedents (ethical 
decision making variations), implications of 
managerial psychological traps  and the role of 
the authority bias at moral level. 
   
Results & Implications 
Chapter 5 for presentation of findings 
and 6 for research implications and 
contributions 
Category analysis, presentation and 
interpretation of the results. 
Managerial implications and future 
research. 
 Operationalization and Field-Work 
Chapter 4: Methodology and research design 
along with exploratory nature of the research 
design 
Re-conceptualizing of concrete theoretical 
concepts to a list of topics. Interview design and 
to assess and understand the phenomenon. 
 
 
Majority of the articles included in this study are published in peer-reviewed top 
journals and are highly cited. The review included some theoretical papers and books though 
empirical papers are examined as well.  
Articles found were mainly published in the: Academy of Management Journal, 
Academy of Management Review, Harvard Business Review, Strategic Management Journal, 
Business Ethics Quarterly, British Management Review, Mc Kinsey Quarterly, to name a few. 
The review considers articles from 1954 to 2017. The latter process resulted in over 120 
articles, thus in order to filter the highly-cited ones, it was used google scholar to identify those 
that have been highly cited out of the initial sample. This filtering led to less than 90 articles. 
The purpose was to use solely the articles that directly assessed: the importance of middle 
managers, the psychological traps and authority bias and the aspects of ethicality in decision 
making.  
  The relevant literature is reviewed in the following sections by classifying and 
discussing psychological traps. At the beginning it is provided an overview of the literature, 
that discusses middle managers’ role in decision making, then the selected dimensions of 
psychological traps and authority bias and finally conducts an overview of all related published 
studies on ethical decision making.   
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Chapter 2: The role of middle manager and the roots of psychological traps and 
ethical decision making 
 
In this chapter, it will be provided the literature review on middle managers and their 
importance for this study. In addition, the study considers the relevant and recent literature on 
psychological traps and authority bias. And lastly, it will be presented an overview of ethical 
decision making: what was being studied in recent years.  
 
2.1 Overview of middle managers in decision making  
The role of middle managers in decision making has been widely criticized. According to  
Jaeger & Pekruhl, (1998) the concept of the middle manager could be essentially discussed. 
Firstly, as either the essence of being a facilitator manager or as a conventional hurdle within 
the work force and the board of directors. Within these polar views there is an extensive range 
of distortions and deceptions which make problematic to define the main circumstances under 
which basic various decisions are made. 
Throughout the specialized works has been reviewed the role that middle managers play in 
many types of decision making. Firstly, management as a concept traditionally had a top-down 
process that separated decision makers from actual implementers. However, later on, 
Wooldridge & Floyd, (1990) strongly suggested that middle managers have an active role 
regarding both the “thinking” and the “doing” of decision processes within the company. 
Hence, the contemporary middle manager is a versatile individual who needs to present a 
myriad of characteristics and capabilities at constant interplay with the aim of fulfilling the 
various external and internal demands (De Cremer & Tenbrunsel, 2012). 
 Currie & Procter, (2005) supported that the middle managers’ superiority is reflected 
either by their knowledge that their position provides than their hierarchical authority. The 
latter, point permits them to stimulate interaction and innovation within various parts of the 
business processes though at the same time exposing them in several flaws that affect their 
judgement. Some of the managers, are found to be less involved and effective in the process of 
decision making than others and undoubtedly this underlines the consequences regarding 
business performance (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007). This is the reason for specialized research 
to investigate this matter in depth and try to identify the most relevant biases that mid-level 
managers face in a corporation and to reveal the errors that can occur. 
Less than a decade, organizational structure within various companies changed, in an 
effort to rethink the vertical hierarchical structure and thus empower the flexibility of decision 
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makers within different managerial levels. By doing so, the mid-level managers role has been 
altered, shifting their job features from the pure implementation of commands from boardroom 
or monitoring the completion of business processes to the conduction and implementation of 
change and challenge, formulating and assuming duties, and coaching other individuals in the 
organization (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007). 
Therefore, it is vital to understand that all aspects of responsibilities of middle managers are 
subjected to hidden flaws and biases. The latter, reduces their ability to obtain competitive 
maintainable benefits for the company resulted by prudent decisions. Thus, individual 
knowledge, core abilities and thinking processes of each middle manager should play a 
catalytic role in finding hidden traps, correcting them and detecting new opportunities for the 
organization (Ford, Ford, & D'Amelio, 2008). 
 
Individual and contextual factors  
The roles of middle managers are affected as well by various factors that might modify the 
way they perform in their daily work routine and thus the way that they make decisions. These 
factors can be either internal individual flaws as mentioned earlier or external contextual 
factors in their work unit. 
External factors may refer to a source of information where middle managers should be 
looking at to find new opportunities as well as potential threats. This external environment is 
divided in turn into macro-environment and micro-environment.  
It is referred as macro-environment the one that affects the functions of the firm and all 
other businesses operating under the same conditions. The micro-environment refers to the 
particular processes within the company and it is conditioned by the intensity and nature of the 
competition (Johnson, Scholes, & Whittington, 2008). Whereas the decisions made by the 
organization barely can affect the macro-environment, the micro-environment is more 
dynamic, complex and more influential.  
From a managerial perspective, the latter complexity of the micro-environment 
contributes with the creation of a really problematic atmosphere to deal with and the success 
on the development of middle managers’ performance is going to depend on their ability to 
adapt and to react to continuous changes, challenges and pressures. According to Stoker (2006), 
who revised the matter deeply, it is the internal environment and its changes which influence 
and determine the personal characteristics required to play the role of middle manager.  
 
 11 
Following the lead, Raman (2009) goes on with the “pressure” and “tension” idea 
underlining that top management and middle management, both suffer from internal pressures 
because of the conflict of interests that any middle manager is forced to balance. One of the 
causes for that pressure, he points out, could be low levels of procedural justice. Huy (2002) 
and Currie & Procter (2005) who stress that attention should be given to middle managers as 
receptors of pressure and how this might affect their working life and the thinking processes. 
As middle managers play a central role bringing about change, this change as a delicate 
issue for any company has to be led by managers well-trusted within the organization (Detert 
& Treviño, 2010). Middle managers should be able to impact macro variables as they cascade 
across systems and also impact micro variables allowing them to cultivate successful change 
(Raelin & Cataldo, 2011).  
 Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd (2008) suggested that future research should investigate 
on the psychological foundations of middle management behavior. In particular, to elaborate 
on links of distort perceptions and decisions that are tied to certain behaviors. And continued 
their suggestion on individual managerial behaviors connected to the company and group-level 
processes and activities. Hence, this research focuses on the effect of the concepts of these 
distortions and their interactions with ethical outcomes.  
 
2.2 The concept of psychological traps in decision making  
For half a century, researchers have been studying the way that the mind functions in making 
decisions. From Simon’s (1955) early research the literature acknowledges that decision 
making usually falls under several factors that are not purely rational. These deviations of 
decision making have been investigated within several theories, though this research focuses 
on the model of biases and heuristics. These mental shortcuts are cognitive mechanisms and 
subjective opinions that individual use to assist in making decisions. Daniel Kanheman and 
Amos Tversky introduced the idea of cognitive biases in 1974. Their research and their model 
was recognized in 2002 when Kanheman received the Nobel Prize in economics on his 
specialized model on biases and behavioral psychology. 
 Researchers have defined the latter domain earlier starting from Ward Edwards  (1954) 
that brought together concepts of psychology, decision theory and economics.  One year later 
Herbert Simon (1955) introduced the term of bounded rationality which actually defines the 
main problem in which this field of study is focusing. His research acknowledged the inherited 
limitations of individual thinking processes and also introduced simplifying heuristics that 
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decision makers cope with. In conclusion, the studies of decision making and judgement in 
1950’s and 1960’s included the following elements: 
i. The normative theory of rational belief and choice. The latter theory sets certain 
standards to which individual behaviors’ can be compared.  
ii. Particular emphasis on risky choice and the neglect of the issue of decisional 
conflict. 
iii. And lastly analysis on cognitive and psychological terms as well as the neglect 
of social and emotional factors.  
 
In 1974 Kanheman and Tversky, introduced the theory of heuristics and biases, as 
earlier mentioned, that was characterized by two main features: 
a. Emphasis of cognitive processes described generally as heuristics of judgement. 
The characteristics of which are used to predict various phenomena of judgment 
and choice. 
b. A method that emphasizes on simple experiments between individuals by 
focusing on their life experience. 
 
In the next two decades, a “third generation” research approach introduced the concept of 
contingent weighting where various ways of obtaining a ranking of alternatives produce 
systematically different orders. Besides the latter theory, several researchers on heuristic and 
biases have identified a lift of “effects” or psychological traps in making decisions. Some of 
the heuristics can be described as sensory misperceptions and other take the form of biases or 
irrational anomalies of the thinking processes. Recognizing that what makes all of them 
dangerous is their invisibility, as they are hard-wired into the decision making processes. Thus, 
most individuals fail to recognize and they fall into them.  These routines are simple mental 
shortcuts that can be characterized as navigators through-out a decision making process (Gál, 
Mrva, & Meško, 2013; Hammond et al., 2006).  
The most recent research identified four well-documented major heuristics of judgment or 
psychological traps that commonly experience by decision makers: anchoring, status quo, sunk 
cost and framing. The authors, that did their research on senior managers, found that these traps 
lead to a failure of evaluating alternatives and that decisions often lead in unfavorable outcomes 
for both the decision makers and their organization. (Hammond et al., 2006) 
In managerial positions the individual is exposed to day-to-day decisions while dealing with 
psychological traps that are able to undermine business decisions. While no one can actually 
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rid his/her own flaws the literature suggest that learn to understand the traps and compensate 
for them is vital. From the experimental research - of MIT Professor Dan Ariely (2008), 
psychologist of judgement Daniel Kahneman (2012) and others - carried out, four main 
stability biases or psychological traps are chosen: the anchoring trap, the status-quo trap, the 
sunk-cost trap and the framing trap (Ariely, 2008; Hammond et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.1 The anchoring trap 
Anchoring effects in decision making were first introduced by Slovic (1967), who 
investigated descriptions of preference reversals. However, the anchoring effect as studied 
today was mainly introduced by Kanheman and Tversky (1974) in their specialized research 
on judgement under uncertainty. According to the authors the anchoring effect is: 
The disproportionate influence on decision makers’ judgements that are biased toward an 
initial presented value.  
 
Following their study, several researchers have demonstrated how common is to 
identify anchoring trap in human decision making processes, including general knowledge and 
probability estimates. General knowledge researchers have identified anchoring traps by asking 
the participants questions such as the freezing point of a certain liquid and so on, though in a 
laboratory setting. However, judgment in real-life judgements such as legal judgements, or 
negotiations and self-efficacy have presented that the effect can be very powerful. What is 
more impressive is not the robustness of the anchoring trap with different judgements but the 
fact that the higher the uncertainty, the lower the familiarity and the personal involvement in a 
problem, the stronger the anchoring effects become (Furnham & Boo, 2011).  
In order to understand how the anchoring effect works it is vital to present the 
psychological mechanisms that contribute to it. Tversky and Kanheman suggested that 
individuals make insufficient adjustments to arrive to a final estimation based on the initially 
presented parameter. That means that individuals that are exposed to a higher anchor are prone 
to insufficient adjustments downward and vice versa.  Strack & Mussweiler (1997) explained 
that the values of anchors serve as a reference point that people use in order to adjust the 
boundary of a range of values for a specific problem or question. By assuming that, the anchor 
is more extreme than the boundary value for the range of possible answers. 
 The current perception on anchoring trap focuses on confirmatory hypothesis testing 
and affirms that anchoring traps result from the activation of certain information that are 
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aligned with the presented anchor. Hence, decision makers are looking for plausible answers 
to test their hypothesis in which the anchor value is the most appropriate one and thus activate 
the aspects that are confirming the initial estimation.  Therefore, it has been supported that 
“confirmatory research” and “selection accessibility” are the main mechanisms responsible for 
anchoring traps. The literature presents various perspectives though the figure below 
demonstrates the most important ones: 
 
Figure 2. Views on the explanation of anchoring traps (from Furnham & Boo, 2011) 
 
  
The research did not solely focus on the values of anchors but also considers the human 
components that may contribute to the susceptibility to the anchoring trap as presented in the 
figure below: 
Figure 3. Human components considered in the anchoring literature (from Furnham & Boo, 2011) 
 
Lastly, when it comes to business decision making the literature defined the role of 
anchoring as “a non-objective” procedure, in which the mind gives disproportionate weight to 
 15 
the first information it receives thus initial impressions or estimations or data anchor 
subsequent judgments (Dye, Hulme, & Roxbourg, 2003). 
 
“Anchoring can be a powerful tool for strategists. In negotiations, naming a high sale 
price for a business can help secure an attractive outcome for the seller, as the buyer’s offer 
will be anchored around that figure […]” though “Anchoring can be dangerous particularly 
when it is a question of becoming anchored to the past […]”  (DYE et al., 2003). 
 
The latter indicates that in business the most common types of anchors refer to a past 
event or even trend. And consequently, the anchoring trap reveals how powerful impact has an 
initial idea or number on subsequent strategic conversations and decision making processes.  
Kahneman (2012) suggests that solely by thinking the opposite or considering the extreme 
situations of a problem might an individual reduce or eliminate the anchoring effect.  
In conclusion there are more than 40 years of research on the anchoring trap which have 
illustrated how robust the effect can be. It can be found in an array of decisional tasks within 
different settings and groups. Though everyone in the area of this study acknowledge that their 
individual differences regarding the extend that are affected by anchors. Future work should 
focus on the approach on how anchoring effects affect social group decisions. That can have 
an important benefit for organizations in order to see their moral impact within personal flaws 
and the outcomes of them.  
 
2.2.2 The status-quo trap 
The theory of status quo trap was firstly introduced by Kanheman and Tversky (1974) 
though it was explained solely in terms of loss aversion. The term was better described later by 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser as: individuals’ tendency on doing nothing or maintain one’s 
current or previous decision.  
The above statement includes two main features of status quo: 
➢ Individuals prefer to maintain the current state of affairs 
➢ People are not willing to take action and change or adapt this state.  
 
The later features can be explained in terms of loss aversion as stated previously. Since a 
change entails expected losses and gains and since individuals are loss avert the losses are 
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weighted more than the gains. Therefore, individuals are prone to accept a decision that the 
expected gains are slightly higher than the losses.  
Another explanation recognizes that status quo requires solely an omission. In other words, 
even if the alternations yield losses and benefits, omissions are favored. In related research 
Kanheman and Tversky (1982) have presented the fact that individuals feel a more stressful 
emotional reaction to situations that involve actions relative to events which have identical 
outcomes though do not involve actions. Later Paul Landman (1988) extended the latter finding 
supporting that people feel more thrilled when a positive outcome resulted from action rather 
than inaction. The anticipation for such positive or negative feelings accounts for status quo 
bias. And these because it might happen that from a decision under uncertainty the negative 
feelings are weighted more heavily that the potential positive and that is when status quo 
appears. 
Recent experimental studies, have demonstrated the ubiquity and strength of status quo 
trap. They proved that the status quo bias can restrain individuals and generate an aversion of 
ambiguity when the ambiguous option is the status quo (Roca, Hogarth, & Maule, 2006). 
Undoubtedly, people are resistant to any form of change, a fact that is connected with the fear 
of altering their status-quo if active steps are undertaken. In other words, the status-quo bias is 
aversion to loss as most of individuals are concerned about the risk of losing than excited by 
the prospect of gaining. A similar effect, that can explain the latter, is the endowment effect 
that lead people to hang on to what they already own (DYE et al., 2003). 
In managerial decision making that might be formulated as avoiding choosing between A 
and B. The latter, demands an effort to shift places or ideas thus sticking to the status-quo 
mainly represents the safer course as it exposes the manager at less psychological risk. The 
power of this trap is generated by the business itself where sins of commission tend to be 
punished severely compering to sins of omission, thus status-quo attracts most of managers 
and holding them from taking a swift action to impose a new one (Hammond et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.3 The sunk-cost trap 
The sunk cost trap also known as the suck cost fallacy or effect was firstly introduced in 
1974 by Kahneman and Tversky. Though it was better defined by Arkes and Blumer (1985) as 
the: “Tendency to continue an endeavor once an investment in effort, time or money is made” 
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Psychologists have investigated the sunk cost effect for several decades, using the term 
under the notion of “irrational escalation of commitment”. The sunk cost fallacy can be also 
found in the literature under the following names or mechanisms: 
i. Self-justification 
ii. A fixed reference point and loss aversion 
The literature also acknowledges the fact that sunk cost traps are also sensitive to framing 
bias, and are minimized by pointing out the salience of incremental costs. In fact, there is a 
powerful reverse sunk cost bias when the sum of incremental cost exceeds the total benefit. 
Another important contribution is that the completion of a certain project psychological 
replaces the profit goal (Friedman, Pommerenke, Lukose, Milam, & Huberman, 2007).  
Non-experimental studies demonstrated the effect of sunk cost trap. The studies 
underline the important of unobserved components of performance. Baron et al (2001) 
identified that several companies in United States are more likely to terminate complete 
projects following the departure of high level managers. The latter has a significant effect on 
the insensitivity of manager’ towards costs sunk by their predecessors.  
A peculiar explanation of sunk cost trap refers to it as a selection bias. That can be seen 
particularly in e-commerce. Schwartz (1999) found that the managers of Wall Street Journal 
site intentionally slowed the process of login for users in the belief that they would spend more 
time on the platform.   
To summarize sunk cost trap is characterized by two main distinct psychological 
mechanisms(Friedman, Pommerenke, Lukose, Milam, & Huberman, 2007): 
i. Self-justification that brings individuals, that have sunk cost resources, into an 
unprofitable action to irrationally reconsider their beliefs regarding the 
profitability of a certain investment. That happens in order to avoid the unpleasant 
fact that there is a mistake and there are also wasted sunk resources.  
ii. Loss aversion that sets individuals in a position that they choose an additional 
investment whose incremental return happens to have negative expected value 
though still maintain the belief that exists some chance of a positive return on the 
overall investment.  
Additionally, a common approach of a decision maker in a business environment would be 
to identify the future consequences of current projects or investments. The sunk-cost fallacy 
manifest by inducing the attention on historical costs, that are not by any mean recoverable, 
when considering future courses of decision processes. Or, in other words the decision to invest 
in a losing account when better options are available. 
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Frequently, this phenomenon is correlated with the willigness of the manager to admit a 
mistake. As a result, the fear of acknowledging a poor decision leads to a self-commitment 
towards past decisions that undeniably are responsible for originating the problematic decisions 
at a first point. (Kahneman, 2012) 
Moreover, it is observed that a corporate culture is able to reinforce the sunk-cost trap. 
More precisely, depending on the form of penalties that are given for decisions that occurred 
unfavorable outcome, managers can be motivated to let failed projects drag on over and over 
again, hoping that they will be able to transform these projects into positive business outcome 
(Hammond et al., 2006). 
 
2.2.4 The framing trap 
The central discussion of rational decision making refers to a logical consistency across 
decisions without considering the way and the manner in which available choices are presented. 
Though, the human decisions are challenged by a range of empirical data. Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) emphasized in the latter deviation from the rational theory and they 
introduced the framing effect as the main variant of their theory.  
The main premise of framing theory is that a problem can be viewed from a various 
perspectives and be considered as having implications for several considerations and values. 
Thus, framing: refers to an activity in which individuals develop a certain conceptualization 
for a given issue.  
And more precisely it can be supported that framing trap “starts with a convectional 
expectancy value model of an individual’s attitude”. In this perspective, individual’s attitude 
regarding a certain object, is “the weighted sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about that 
object” (Nelson et al. 1997b). 
The typical attitude of a decision maker starts by evaluating various outcomes relative to 
a neutral reference point. Therefore, the point of the view has a significant effect on whether 
the problem is framed positively or negatively and thus “affecting the resulting risk preference 
of the decision maker” (Bazerman & Moore, 2008). 
In other words, the way in which a problem is framed can be profoundly influenced by the 
manager’s choices. The literature appears to underline two well-documented types of frames 
that distort decision making, namely: 
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(a) Frames – gains versus losses: alternative pairs of choices are available that are precisely 
equivalent but they have been framed in a different way. The choices of people can 
reveal if the problem is posed in terms of gains or in terms of avoiding losses. 
(b) Frames – various reference points: two or more questions can pose the same problem 
but with different reference point. A simple yet concrete example is generated by the 
literature below: “Let’s say you have $2,000 in your checking account and you are 
asked the following question:  
• Would you accept a fifty-fifty chance of either losing $300 or winning $500? Would you 
accept the chance?  
• What if you were asked this question: Would you prefer to keep your checking account 
balance of $2,000 or to accept a fifty-fifty chance of having either $1,700 or $2,500 in 
your account?  
[…] While your answers to both questions should, rationally speaking, be the same, 
studies have shown that many people would refuse the fifty-fifty chance in the first 
question but accept it in the second. Their different reactions result from the 
different reference points presented in the two frames. The first frame, with its 
reference point of zero, emphasizes incremental gains and losses, and the thought 
of losing triggers a conservative response in many people’s minds. The second 
frame, with its reference point of $2,000, puts things into perspective by 
emphasizing the real financial impact of the decision […]”(Hammond et al., 2006). 
 
Specifically, in business the peculiarity of this trap is that is closely related and also lead 
to other biases. The framing trap can establish anchors or even a status-quo, it can be also 
argued that a frame can highlight sunk costs or lead managers towards a false consensus 
(Hammond et al., 2006). 
 
2.3 Compliance: The authority bias and procedural (in)justice 
In this sub-chapter it will be introduced another bias, slightly different from psychological 
traps that arises from the interaction between the individual and the environment. 
The authority bias was firstly introduced my Milgram’s study in 1974.  In his experiment 
Milgram conducted multiple iterations in order to demonstrate the extent to which people will 
commit heinous acts and the ease with which authority bias: can coerce decision makers into 
corrupt actions or better compliance to unfair processes. 
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Milgram through his experiment affirms that in a situation where an authoritarian 
personality demands for obedience instead of the person’s character, occurs that the latter 
crosses the ethical boundaries and harms an innocent person. The theory recognizes a series of 
factors caused from a situation or a social force that lead individuals to intentional unethical 
decisions (Milgram, 1974). In fact, studies have found that the ethicality of one person can be 
affected by the actions seen on somebody’s else behavior. (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009) 
Within companies, the implicit and explicit pressure to follow the behavioral processes and 
norms has significant effect on how individuals can be easily manipulated into conforming to 
the values of the authoritarian figures or group. That can be explained by: 
a. The individual need to socially identify in a group and in this case in their 
company 
b. Strong desire to belong 
c. Avoid social exclusion 
 
On the same way the literature acknowledges that authority that uses fair processes can 
promote perceptions of the induvial involved in a way that they see their organization more 
neutral and fair. Tenbrunsel ( 2003) noted that authorities, like organization and managers, are 
able to have such a strong compliance effect to the employees’ perceptions and expectations to 
act in a moral way or not as well as to established procedural (in) justice. In a similar study, 
Tyler (2007) found that if the authority figure is exercising its authority within fair conditions, 
individuals involved tend to think that the rules are legitimate in the decisions making processes 
and outcomes.  Therefore, the employees’ decision making values will be activated when 
evaluating their authority/organization as being ruled in procedurally just ways.  
The above studies show that procedural (in)justice judgements potentially can shape 
rule related behavior and that is mainly explained by the impact of procedural justice on ethical 
values. These findings support the argument that fair authority behavior on the part of 
management coerce desirable behavior from employees. Therefore, by acting fairly a company 
motivates the employee to both follow the policies and avoid engaging in acts that undermine 
efficiency and effectiveness of the organization.  
Although, since companies are hierarchical, even if there is a culture of fairness and 
ethos it will be unimportant if the authority is not motivated to act toward a fair objective. In 
recent years the case of Enron scandal appears to exist more and more within managers. 
Furthermore, studies show that the employees will comply to the authority though when they 
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become aware that their organization acts against their values they become less committed to 
the main ethical norms.  
The reality is that the senior or mid-level managers will make the ultimate decision, 
though the people participating in the process must believe that their views were considered 
and that they had a genuine opportunity to influence the final decision. Consequently, it occurs 
that perception of fairness can alter the biases of decision making as mentioned on the previous 
chapter. Researchers have documented that if the participants believe the process was fair, they 
are far more willing to commit themselves to the resulting decision even if their approaches 
did not prevail. Reasonably the experience of procedural justice enhances individual cognitive 
confidence in the procedures of decision making thus resulted to distort authority biases 
involved by building commitment and loyalty within teams and towards the company (Kim & 
Mauborgne, 1993). 
These studies present one promising approach to stop employee misbehavior and avoid 
corporate scandals that have been present in the last years. This approach is to emphasize 
appropriate work culture in order to motivate employees to act based on a feeling of 
responsibility and obligation to their own values of morality and also to the norms of the 
company and thus avoid any authority bias that can enhance bad reactions.  
 
2.4 Recent research on ethical decision-making 
The last 20 years several corporate scandals, like Enron and WorldCom, emerged and that 
promoted the interest of scientific field of business ethics and ethical decision making. Business 
ethics definition can be found at Ferrell et al. (2008) that presented business ethics as the field 
that copes with questions about whether specific business practices are acceptable. Or at 
Trevino et al (2006) who supported that behavioral ethics: “refers to individual behavior that 
is subject to or judged according to generally accepted norms of behavior” 
 
Consequently, and under the definition of business ethics, it is important to state that key 
players involved in business scandals support that they are not unethical and that they did not 
have any intention to harm others. The literature supports that many decision makers in the 
business are aware of their companies’ code of conducts but obviously they failed to act with 
responsibility and in an ethical manner. The latter idea was supported by the simple explanation 
that these scandals are a responsibility of few bad apples. However, more recent approaches 
note that ethical failures, in society or in an organization, apply to all individuals and not just 
few bad apples (Trevino et al 2006).  This approach is that based on the idea that: 
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 under the right circumstances all individuals can act unethically and that is the main 
assumption of behavioral ethics.  
Because of the focus on individual behavior it is clear that the studies so far mainly draw 
work from psychology. Therefore, the use of psychological insights is vital to understand why 
sometimes good people can do bad things. The study of Bazerman and Banaji (2004) notes on 
this matter that efforts in order to improve ethical decision making are betted fulfilled at 
understand psychological tendencies. Thus rather than demonstrating how ethical people 
should behave the literature suggests to insist on understanding the psychological processes 
that individual pass through when they make actual decisions (Bazerman & Banaji, 2004). 
Most individuals within and outside the business environment are aware of the range of 
behaviors that will never be acceptable in a workplace or in the society. When it comes to 
people in business this is even more profound as it involves ethical decision rules and 
appropriate moral behaviors that can be promoted. Regardless the latter element unethical and 
irresponsible decisions are emerging constantly. In other words, a situation or a specific context 
can be sufficiently compelling for someone in order to cross ethical boundaries. The theory 
suggests that understanding these circumstances and enabling leaders to promote morality in 
their organizations is vital and fundamental idea of behavioral ethics. (De Cremer, Van Dick, 
Tenbrunsel, Pillutla, & Murnighan, 2011). 
One of the most popular approaches on preventing unethical decisions and actions suggests 
formal educational programs and rules in order to help managers to tackle with trust (M. 
Schwartz, 2001). Though the theory recognizes the problematic nature of this as ethical 
awareness is not necessarily achieved through rules and trust management (Ludwig & 
Longenecker, 1993). 
In behavioral ethics scholars have been focusing their research into two main pillars (Gino, 
2015): 
i. The first pillar of study is isolating predictable social circumstances and 
situational factors which lead to an unethical behavior. In the latter case we 
mainly recognize behaviors of individuals that are aware of their unethical 
action though incapable of knowing and recognizing the forces that lead to cross 
ethical boundaries.  
ii. The second pillar is about individuals that have an unintentional tendency to 
engage in unethical actions without being aware of doing it. 
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Figure 4. The steps involved in ethical decision making (Salvador & Folger, 2009) 
 
According to the theory, individuals can act unethically while being absolutely unaware 
of theirs or someone’s else unethical behavior (Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005). Following 
this statement, other studies argue that people fail to isolate and recognize conflicts of interest 
that corrupt their behavior. As a matter of fact when individuals are determined to neglect 
seeing someone’s unethical actions they will not see it (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). Moreover, it 
is claimed that a person is more likely to condemn someone’s unethical decisions when the 
outcome of his actions is bad rather than considering the same when the outcome is good. 
(Cushman, Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009). 
One of the main erroneous assumptions of the literature on ethical behavior is the idea 
that all individuals are rationally driven to their actions and in accordance to their motives and 
their intentions while understanding the result of their actions (Dunn, 2004). Individuals are 
prone to experience both intentional or unintentional unethical choices. Thus, the latter 
approach considers that there is no elaborated or rational filter process rather than a quick and 
sudden reaction to an ethical judgement (Haidt, 2001). 
Ironically, decision makers are psychological motivated to maintain a framed ethical 
view of their selves. Though as individuals set their immunity in a higher level than the 
situation and view as well any positive outcome as appropriate, occurs that they are unable to 
recognize conflicts of interest and their ethicality lead to sub-ethical actions. This underlines 
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the illusion of objectivity as a situation is rarely recognized when self-serving biases occur 
(Chugh et al., 2005). 
One other important aspect of the theory states that individuals which potentially 
perceive a failure or loss in the outcomes of their actions will probably cross the boundaries 
and engage more to unethical actions in order to avert their loss than the ones who perceive 
that they are going to gain (Kern & Chugh, 2009). These traps can occur when the individual 
is requested to react automatically rather than reasonably, as reasoning is fragile to being 
rushed or fragmented because of time limits for instance (Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002). Therefore, psychological traps give an opportunity to see automaticity in ethical 
decision making.  
Considering the theoretical and empirical research that has been conducted the literature 
suggests that given the right circumstances likely all of us may commit unethical actions (De 
Cremer, Mayer, & Schminke, 2010). Hence, the study on psychological tendencies and on 
influences of the organizational environment may prove particularly valuable in order to 
understand ordinary unethical behavior (Gino, 2015). 
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Chapter 3: Bounded ethicality and implications of psychological traps 
 
This second part of literature review focuses on the theory of bounded ethicality and on the 
five theoretical cases of it. Furthermore, it is presented how psychological traps of bounded 
rationality, that analyzed previously, might manifest on the cases of bounded ethicality. To do 
so, certain linkages were created that will be used on the empirical part of this thesis.  
 
3.1 Bounded rationality, bounded ethicality and conjectures on psychological traps  
 
Within societies, in this case corporations, individuals have developed their interactions 
with others based on various constrains. Yet these constrains are solely useful with the rational 
active cooperation of the individual (North, 1991). The latter level of coherence or “rationality” 
of individuals at is core - and based on various scholars - is in doubt. As a matter of fact, it is 
supported that humans are the opposite of perfectly rational (Ariely, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). 
This is better described by Herbert Simon as bounded rationality (Simon, 1955).  
Bounded rationality, between 1955 and 2000, served as the integrating point of the studied 
on behavioral decision making. The concept shows that people judgment deviates from 
rationality. After Simon’s work Kanheman and Tverky (1974) provided specific systematic 
biases involved in the concept of bounded rationality as presented earlier in this thesis.  
Individuals are not inclined to recognize inconsistencies, as a result global incoherence 
regarding actions and outcomes of behaviors can occur for long periods (Sunstein, Kahneman, 
Schkade, & Ritov, 2002). Similarly, a comprehensive and internally consistent system of 
ethical intuitions is utopic to consider, as human decision making is highly dependent on 
immediate context- that is  affected by the quality of processes by which decisions are made 
and executed (Lind & Tyler, 1988) – as well as by consequential  unconscious acts of the 
options that they consider, or as mentioned on chapter 2 the individual psychological 
tendencies (Kahneman, 2003). 
The theory of bounded rationality does not stop solely there but suggests that ethicality is 
also bounded, malleable and dynamic. The concept of bounded ethicality is part of the concept 
of bounded rationality. Similarly bounded ethicality refers to the notion that: “our moral and 
ethical standards are colored by self-favoring interpretations”.  That makes individuals to 
display easily a behavior that is against the ethical norms (Banaji, Bazerman, & Chugh, 2003).  
The idea of bounded ethicality is that people are perceiving themselves as ethical, thus 
maintain a certain ethical self-image while making unethical decisions. The assumption on the 
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determinants of human action so far is that all individuals are conscious agents which is clearly 
refuted based on the latter evidence. The limitations of conscious will, drive individuals not 
solely in bad decisions but in unethical behaviors (Kern & Chugh, 2009). 
In business bounded ethicality: appears when management make a decision that not solely 
harms others but also is completely inconsistent with the decision maker’s personal values and 
beliefs.  
Managers engage in these behaviors by developing protective cognitions and behavioral 
biases that condemn them upon further reflection. When an ethically questionable situation 
arrives to a manager that is not in essence part of their responsibility, they fail to get involved 
and justify their inaction as ethical. When it is evident that their inaction can be more harmful 
than many errors that occur in action (Chugh et al., 2005). 
Therefore, in the following part, the research provides specific linkages concerning the 
implications of psychological traps/tendencies of bounded rationality on the cases of bounded 
ethicality.  By using these manifestations, the research tries to understand how the biases of 
bounded rationality (psychological traps and authority bas) might play crucial role on shaping 
ethically (in)correct actions and behaviors.  
 
3.1.1 Implicit ethical attitudes and framing implications 
 
The literature supports that one main case of bounded ethicality is implicit ethical 
attitudes that are rooted in fundamental mechanisms of thought and are activated automatically. 
These mechanisms lead individuals to various associations in order to trust their intentions 
which most of the times are not aligned with their expectations. Implicit attitudes are derived 
from these unconscious associations that can appear in the workplace just as they do anywhere 
else (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). 
The majority of people have a certain belief toward their attitudes, thinking that they 
have the complete control and conscious awareness.  This view in the concept of bounded 
ethicality is challenged by the bias of implicit attitudes. Implicit ethical attitudes may refer to 
automatically activated stereotypes. In some cases, even individuals that have an egalitarian 
value system are keeping in their minds unflattering stereotypes that are activated without 
intention or conscious awareness (Macrae and Bodenhausen, 2001). 
The presence of such unconscious attitudes on the judgements of an individual set an 
important bound. They yield bounds on the degree that an individual can guarantee that her 
own behavior is consistent with the ethical beliefs that she wants to express. One more evidence 
why human ethicality is bounded. Even if individuals neglect the fact that they behaved in 
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inconsistent ways, with negative stereotyped behaviors, their explicit intentions are 
contradicted by the implications of their actions.  
Psychologists developed a useful tool on measuring implicit attitudes. The Implicit 
Associations Test or IAT that mainly measures the strength of a human’s implicit associations 
among two pairs of categories such as good/bad and white/black. The research, with the use of 
this tool, provided some interesting results. They supported that most individuals have little 
control over the expression of implicit attitudes regarding certain stereotypes (Banaji et al., 
2003). Banaji also supported that implicit attitudes follow an ordinary mental process of: 
✓ categorization, 
✓ perception, 
✓ memory and 
✓ judgement 
Thus, she addressed the issue as “ordinary prejudice”. She supported that if ordinary mental 
processes are part on expressions of prejudice and stereotypes then ordinary managers, 
executives or other professionals will demonstrate them. In addition, other studies have found 
that implicit attitudes yield specific ways of behavior. Namely: 
➢ Discrimination by attributing specific categorizations and judgements 
➢ Nonverbal behaviors toward certain group of people 
➢ Spontaneous behaviors 
To summarize, implicit attitudes “[…] are quick, intuitive, automatic, relatively 
effortless, unintentional and can operate outside of conscious awareness.[…]” (Marquardt & 
Hoeger, 2009). 
A practical example of implicit unethical racist/sexist attitude in business, can be derived 
from Morgan Stanley and other investment banks that they fail to recognize gender inequity in 
their operations. More precisely, in 2004 Morgan Stanley was forced to pay $54 million to 
settle a sex discrimination case. The company was accused by female managers that it failed 
to provide equal payment and also promotions as the main body of the managers was consisted 
by white men that were in charge for each top or mid-level operation. These male managers 
were unable to recognize the existence of gender discrimination in their decision making 
processes. Therefore, the company was also obliged to include antidiscrimination trainings for 
managers and reconsider their attitudes and their attributions in the company (Mcgeehan, 
2004).   
Another practical example comes from Merrill Lynch and more precisely from a lawsuit of 
$2.2 millions that was filed by Hydie Sumner. The employee supported that brokerage 
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managers are unaware of their discriminating processes. She supported that they projected 
success solely for white male profiles as they corresponded to the categorizations that they had 
in mind. In her statement said that: “They have a specific view of what a successful broker or 
manager will look like, and it is not usually a woman or a black or Hispanic.”(Bazerman & 
Moore, 2008). The latter implicit attitudes as it is seen can affect the judgement of managers 
without their conscious awareness and in a manner that might be odd to their personal beliefs.  
 In the same way framing trap are appeared to be active factor of automaticity, engaging 
the individual in implicit mental processes. Thus, cognitive pitfalls of framing traps are 
indicators of the conditions in which decision makers are prone to ethical peril (Kern & Chugh, 
2009).  As mentioned earlier, framing refers to an activity in which individuals develop a 
certain conceptualization for a given issue in the same way that implicit ethical attitudes create 
processes of stereotyped behaviors. And more precisely the trap can be defined as “the 
weighted sum of a series of evaluative beliefs about an object”. (Nelson et al. 1997b)  
Hence, this thesis acknowledges that the framing trap impose greater constrains on 
implicit ethical attitudes and more precisely increase their effect toward ethical failures. 
Therefore, the first Linkage is expressed as follows: The more a manager is prone to framing 
problems the more likely she/he will depend on implicit ethical attitudes.  
 
  
 
 
 
3.1.2 Egocentrism and status quo 
 
A second concept of bounded ethicality is egocentrism and it was introduced by Chugh, 
Banaji and Bazerman (2005). The authors suggested that egocentrism in ethical decision 
making arise form self-interested reasoning that precedes an evaluative moral judgment. These 
egocentric tendencies influence dramatically ethical behavior and decision making as 
individuals are not aware that they behave unethically.  
Moreover, one important element of egocentrism is that it tampers experience so to 
ensure that a certain situation is maintained, though admits no conscious belief that such 
interference happened. Epley & Caruso (2004) supported that the latter limitation of conscious 
will is vital for the success of egocentrism. In addition, they support that memory or experience 
Framing 
Implicit ethical attitudes 
 
Cases of bounded ethicality Psychological traps 
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is distorted with events that have been “self-relevant” versus “not self-relevant”, and 
consequently positive construal of such experiences.  
The egocentric bias is seen in various situations, namely:  
➢ “[..] when individuals tend to overestimate the extent to which others will share their 
attitudes, beliefs, knowledges and emotional reaction […]” (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, 
& Gilovich, 2004), 
➢  “[…] the extent to which others notice and attend to their behavior […]” (Gilovich, 
Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000) and  
➢ “[…] the extent to which their internal states are transparent to others […]” (Gilovich 
et al., 2000). 
Several studies have founded also that individuals have a tendency to focus on their 
own contributions to a joint effort. These self-serving judgements regarding solutions on 
certain problems or allocations of credit or blame, lead to conclusions that can be unfair. 
Specifically, people tend to determine their preference to a specific outcome on the basis of 
their status and ego. Egocentrism not solely motivates to claim more based on self-relevant 
events but also over claim resources. Such behaviors can pose social dilemmas or situations 
which each individual of a certain group or business team has short-term incentives to act in 
an egocentric, self-interested way (Chugh et al., 2005).  
 A practical example of egocentrism can be seen on Enron’s case. Anderson auditors 
have been found guilty for interpreting data in a self-interested way in order to maintain their 
client. Even if audit companies’ managers are supposed to investigate their client’s books in 
an unbiased manner it appears that they tend to act favorably to their ego. For example, they 
might sell to them consulting services or even seek jobs offers from the clients. In conclusion, 
the examples shows that the auditors viewed data in a self-interested way in order to maintain 
their dependency on their clients and that lead on a non-independent auditing system and on 
the disaster that followed with Enron (Bazerman & Moore, 2008).  
Accordingly, status quo trap is highly inherited to individual’ psych as a desire to 
protect ego from any form of damage or even judgement (Hammond et al., 2006). 
Psychological experiments have shown that managers are magnetically attracted to status quo 
as a result of potential damage or loss. Moreover, status quo traps are a consequence of a 
tendency to justify previous commitments by subsequent commitments. Thus, managers are 
even more pulled to status quo when there is an alternative to what they have been experienced 
regarding an event or situation. Consequently, ego as a part of experience or position or role is 
highly valued as a magnetic consequence of status quo (Gál et al., 2013).  
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The above analysis shows that status quo trap may influence on egocentrism drastically. 
More precisely the second Linkage can be presented as follows: The more a manager is prone 
to status quo problems the more likely to be controlled from egocentrism. 
 
 
  
 
 
3.1.3 Ethical uncertainty and anchoring trap 
 
Before the introduction of ethical uncertainty and the connection of anchoring to this 
ethical dimension it is important firstly to consider the elements of the trap. The latter structure 
is considered as it facilitates the process on creating the linkage between ethical uncertainty 
and anchoring.  
Anchoring is a fundamental psychological trap and it is caused by insufficient 
adjustments as final actions are assimilated toward an initial presented estimation (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). The literature suggests that gradual adjustments on the estimation of a 
decision can lead to slightly shift from the anchor, though these adjustments stop when 
individuals are no longer sure if they should go farther (Kahneman, 2012).  
Therefore, uncertainty perpetuates the adjustments, leaving small space on the 
directions away from the anchor, leading decision makers to constantly move closely to the 
anchor. Moreover, adjustments are hard and effortful process in which most decision makers 
and particularly managers are less prone to follow. That is because their mental resources are 
heavily depleted with information related to digits (Epley & Gilovich, 2001).  
Following Kahneman (2012) research, the latter element is no sufficient to describe 
anchoring traps as adjustments are intentional and conscious processes, though as observed 
anchoring traps often do not correspond to a subjective experience. Thus, the role of associative 
coherence is a more compelling component of anchoring traps, suggesting that the puzzle of 
anchors is related to priming effects that selectively stimulate compatible evidence (Englich, 
Mussweiler, & Strack, 2006; Kahneman, 2012).  
The psychological processes that lead to anchor traps make individuals more inclined 
to suggestibility than the self will ever perceive. Accordingly, few individuals are able to draw 
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attention on their gullibility. Kahneman (2012) suggests that a way to avoid anchors is by 
“thinking the opposite”. In other words, negating the biased medley of thoughts and focus on 
what exists further than the uncertainty point.  
Similarly, ethical uncertainty that is the third component of bounded ethicality seems 
to be driven from: 
➢ one’s conception of compulsory “oughts” and also  
➢ the effect of description that an action or behavior falls under.  
 
The first variable is strongly correlated with the epistemic state of the decision maker 
and the sense to follow the objective sense of “ought”. Though, the latter element of ethical 
decision-ought falls under the process of subject-ought. That is related to the given cognitive 
situation of the agent that captures the idea of “ought” on the time of acting. Thus, in the 
moments of clear uncertainty, that determines the individual’s responsibility for an action. 
Hence, the ethical aspects are determined by consequential considerations or adjustments. 
Every ethical theory recognizes that ethical processes are settled by the adjustments of their 
consequences (Jackson & Smith, 2006).  
The second variable arises from the content of intentions. Behaviors that arise from 
uncertainty can fall intentionally under one description but not under another. That means that 
once a degree of belief irrupts into the picture of what is ethical certain and uncertain the action 
falls under this description. There are several theories involving ethical certainty under 
intentional description of actions and intentions but no theory about what is absolutely ethically 
uncertain (Bykvist, 2017; Jackson & Smith, 2006).  
 To apply a general idea on ethical uncertainty the theory assumes that the decision 
maker cares about avoiding doing the wrong thing but she is uncertain regarding the ethical 
status of the behavior. Most likely because of the adjustments around the anchor of  “ought” 
that sometimes require great self-sacrifice (Barry & Tomlin, 2016). That is where a “decision-
ought” and a “subjective-ought” create further ethical uncertainty.  
Two main scandals in business that fall under the elements of ethical uncertainty is the 
HSBC and Wells Fargo ethical failures in 2015 and 2016 respectively. HSBC was accused for 
tax evasion scandal in Swiss as managers tried to inquire customer’s tax affairs. That felt under 
the description of a greater good that could lead the business elsewhere based on manager’s 
and companies’ explanations but it does not alter the uncertainty of such moral behavior.  
Accordingly, Wells Fargo managers attended to meet their sales targets by setting up accounts 
without the consent of their customers. The explanation given form the managers was that this 
 32 
could give an advantage to the bank over it competitors. The sense of objective “ought” that 
adjusted the ethical processes of such decision lead to a compete ethical mistake. Therefore, 
the uncertainty or the illusion of ethos can be very dangerous for companies (Skapinker, 2016). 
Continuing the rational process in which both anchors and ethical uncertainty occur and 
presented in this analysis, a third Linkage is that: the more managers are staying close to their 
anchors the more likely to suffer from ethical uncertainty 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
3.1.4 Cognitive ethical dissonance and sunk cost trap 
 
A fourth element of bounded ethicality is cognitive ethical dissonance. Cognitive 
ethical dissonance: is prompted oxymoronically by the individual temptation to profit from 
unethical behaviour and her/his aspiration to uphold a certain ethical self-image. In other 
words, the discrepancy between one’s actual behaviour and one’s attitudes and values. 
(Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959) 
Research shows that individuals that perceive themselves as highly trustworthy are 
more prone to bend the ethical limits, most likely lie and cut corners in order to benefit 
(Bazerman & Tenbrunsel, 2011). The latter authors, pointed out that when confronted ethical 
dilemmas individuals usually stand for their principles though most fail to examine unethical 
action under an objective light, indicating how completely bounded our rationality and we can 
support ethicality are. In other words, how decision makers behave dishonestly enough to 
benefit and honestly enough to mitigate their perception on their own integrity and ethicality 
(Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). Beside the cognitive inconsistencies regarding criteria of what 
is right and wrong, research identifies dissonance when there is a threat to the self and 
consequently cutback on ethical standards (Barkan, Ayal, Gino, & Ariely, 2012).  
The literature underlines various components that arise when cognitive ethical 
dissonance occurs: 
Ethical uncertainty Anchoring 
Cases of bounded ethicality 
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➢ Shuffling facts and distorting the truth as inventing an outcome evokes more comfort 
than reporting one (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). 
➢ Another element is self-serving altruism that turns wrong behaviours to right ones, thus 
if a lie benefits another person or event, it can be justified and reframed as altruistic 
(Erat & Gneezy, 2012). 
➢ A particular element of cognitive ethical dissonance is ethical licensing. The latter 
means that individuals perceive that previous right deeds provide them with ethical 
credits and thus reduce any threat to ethical self-image  (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 
2009). 
➢ When ethical dissonance is already experienced the literature suggests that more 
elements positively contribute to a vicious circle of ethical failures. One way is to self-
inflict more pain, more guilt, thus the experience of more guilt and pain paradoxically 
leads to emotional relief of past unethical events (Inbar, Pizarro, Gilovich, & Ariely, 
2013). 
➢ Engage to partial confession of the unethical event is another variable where the 
wrongdoer admits partially the fact in order to restore his ethical self-image but not 
enough in order not to be embarrassed or punished irreversibly (Peer, Acquisti, & 
Shalvi, 2014). 
➢ Lastly, moral hypocrisy and distancing are ways to involves at a greater level to ethical 
dissonance. Both are related to asymmetries regarding lenient judgments of self-
violations and explicit condemnation of others violations (Rustichini & Villeval, 2014). 
A strong example of cognitive ethical dissonance and more precisely of ethical licensing 
phenomenon can been seen in Volkswagen scandal. Managers agreed to equip 11 million cars 
with a software that is able to cheat emissions test. In fact, the emissions were up to 40 times 
higher than it is allowed in United States. Managers in America were aware of this issue and 
still proceeded. Suddenly, a company that claimed to be the first in CSR policies in the auto 
motive industry found to act against it. The company became a reflection of its manager’s 
decisions. VW managers acted unethically in the light of previous ethicality (Vlachos, 2017).  
The later agony that is given from cognitive ethical dissonance can be found in sunk-
cost traps as well. Individuals tend to make decisions justifying previous events and 
consciously or not, are unwilling to admit a bad decision. The sunk cost fallacy is mainly caused 
by the escalation of commitment to failing attempts (Arkes & Blumer, 1985).  
Particularly, in managerial decision making, the presence of sunk cost traps leads to 
incentives that are misaligned with the role and the position of the company (Kahneman, 2012). 
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According to Kahneman (2012) sunk costs trap holds people into doomed decisions and 
unpromising and unhappy situations. Moreover, this inconsistent behavior of insisting in 
doomed decisions is present in various researches where anticipated negative consequences 
foster further commitment to the chosen failed decision (Staw, 1976).  
Therefore, based on the analysis, the research supports that sunk cost trap might present 
the following Linkage with cognitive ethical dissonance: The more managers are prone to the 
sunk cost trap the more likely will suffer failures of cognitive ethical dissonance.  
 
  
 
 
 
3.1.5 Ethical erosion and the authority bias (procedural (in)justice) 
In this last segment the research is focusing on the authority bias and its manifestation 
on gradual ethical erosion.  
As described in chapter 2, the authority bias was introduced my Milgram’s study in 1974. 
In his experiment Milgram conducted multiple iterations in order to demonstrate the extent to 
which people will commit heinous acts and the ease with which authority bias: can coerce 
decision makers into corrupt actions or better compliance to unfair processes. 
The principle of authority bias entails that each group of stakeholders has the desire to 
belong and identify herself in a group avoiding any kind of exclusion from processes. As Tyler 
(2007) found, if the authority figure is exercising its authority within fair conditions, 
individuals involved tend to think that the rules are legitimate in the decisions making processes 
and outcomes. Therefore, the employees’ decision making values will be activated when 
evaluating their authority/organization as being ruled in procedurally just ways.  
The above studies show that procedural (in)justice judgements potentially can shape 
rule related behaviour and that is mainly explained by the impact of procedural justice on 
ethical values. However, several studies acknowledge the necessity to create a dichotomy of 
this principle, thus the research refers to justice of process and to justice of outcome (Jackall, 
1988).  Both depend on the situation and are and should be adjustable when there are different 
conclusions, thus individuals should determine which of them is more suitable for each context.  
Nevertheless, even if the latter requirement is met the principle of justice needs to consider a 
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second element in which no rights can be violated thus, an action it is prescribed solely by 
regards of the rights of all whom it affects essentially (Vlastos, 1984).  
Accordingly, procedural justice is the level on which the dynamics of any decision 
process are considered to be fair which in the business environment involves criteria of 
engagement, clear explanation and clarity of expectations. Reasonably the experience of 
procedural justice enhances individual cognitive confidence in the procedures of decision 
making thus resulted to distort authority biases involved by building commitment and loyalty 
within teams and towards the company (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). 
Additionally, the perception of high levels of procedural justice do not built solely cognitive 
confident in the decision makers but also a sense of loyalty, commitment, trust and social 
harmony (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998).  
In the same way to authority bias, ethical erosion, that is the last element of bounded 
ethicality, occurs while being exposed to situations that promoted unethical behaviors. And it 
can be characterized by the following elements: 
i. the slippery slope fallacy of mutual unethical cooperation and also  
ii. ethical dilemmas that lead to deterioration of ethical self-identities.  
 
The slippery slope fallacy affects the acceptance of unethical procedures and behaviors 
leading gradually to ethical erosion (Gino & Bazerman, 2009). Similarly, ethical dilemmas in 
contextual situations can shape one’s views by reducing the salience of a certain identity and 
particularly ethical self-identity (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006).  
   A practical example on ethical erosion that in this case can be significantly connected 
with authority bias can be derived from Yukos/Khodorkovsky case. The case among other 
included illegal privatization of a company and an academic institution and evasion of 
corporate tax obligations and personal tax. Besides the authority figure of Khodorkovsky that 
was accused for a number of criminal cases and characterized by amnesty international as a 
prisoner of conscience, a number of managers’ and employees’ cases surfaced as well. Yukos 
was presented as the most transparent Russian company before the scandal (Tricker & Tricker, 
2014).  
What Yukos case shows is that an authority bias that acts unethically can lead to the 
slippery slope fallacy and to gradual ethical erosion of a whole group of managers and 
employees. Hence, the analysis allows to create the last Linkage in which: the authority bias 
and consequently procedural (in)justice may lead to gradual ethical erosion. 
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For clarity, a summary of all research linkages are provided in Figure 5, that includes 
the anticipated effect of each linkage: 
Figure 5. Linkages of psychological traps and flaws of bounded ethicality 
Linkages on Psychological traps manifestations on the cases of bounded ethicality 
The more a manager is prone to framing problems the more likely she/he will depend on 
implicit ethical attitudes 
The more a manager is prone to status quo problems the more likely to be controlled from 
egocentrism 
The more managers are staying close to their anchors the more likely to suffer from ethical 
uncertainty 
The more managers are prone to the sunk cost trap the more likely will suffer failures of 
cognitive ethical dissonance 
The authority bias and consequently procedural (in)justice may lead to gradual ethical erosion. 
 
 
 In conclusion, by offering the typology of five processes of bounded ethicality – 
implicit attitudes, egocentrism, ethical uncertainty, cognitive dissonance and ethical erosion – 
as they related to psychological traps, this chapter aims to clarify how psychological processes 
play into the dynamic nature of bounded ethicality and can enhance unethical behaviors.  
Therefore, in this chapter, the first task was: to understand the processes relevant to 
bounded ethicality.  
And the second task was: to fill the gap between the cases of bounded ethicality and 
the concepts of psychological traps by creating specific linkages. 
Studying these phenomena make difficult the research topic both because accessing 
quality data is an unending challenge and because studding ethics and psychological tendencies 
as dynamic phenomena requires gathering this difficult to access data over time as well.  
However, this chapter surfaced different paradigms and processes which are relevant to both 
the theories of research. The new approach provides additional opportunity to try to model 
bounded ethicality in new ways. The diffusion of the bounded ethicality processes and the 
psychological tendencies have much to promise particularly in the ethical decision making 
literature.  
Ethical erosion 
 
 
Authority bias 
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 In the next chapters it will provided a better understanding of the linkages. As the 
present study adds a new line on the theory of behavioral ethics, this part of analysis was 
significantly challenging. That is because there are no explicit connections on the examined 
concepts and cases provided by existed researches. Therefore, the aim is to reveal potential 
linkages by using elements of the theory of psychological traps and of the cases of bounded 
ethicality. More evident explanation on how the concepts of psychological traps are connected 
with ethical failures and on how they manifest on the cases of bounded ethicality it is illustrated 
on the analysis of the findings. In the chapter of analysis specific examples are presented on 
the manifestations of each linkage.  
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Chapter 4: Methodology  
 
This chapter and particularly the following segments demonstrate the nature of 
knowledge and the tools that would be utilized in order to access the linkages.  
Accordingly, the following sub-chapters focus:  
1. First, on presenting the methodology and the research paradigm adjusted for this 
research.  
2. Second, the study discusses in depth the research design, operationalization techniques, 
interview design, sample of participants and the coding techniques. 
3. Lastly, finishes by discussing the limitations. 
 
4.1 Methodology and research paradigms 
The stream of this study is based on qualitative, explorative and descriptive approach as 
and uses in-depth, open-ended interviews.  
Qualitative methods have been significantly important in management studies and 
particularly behavioral management researches as they capture and communicate the 
participant’s stories. The purpose is to gather information and discuss the findings that are 
useful. Understanding participant’s stories is useful to the extend which these stories illuminate 
the outcomes and the processes of decisions. The core of this research is to understand: 
➢ what the individuals create of the reality around them,  
➢ how they interpret what they encounter and  
➢ how they assign meanings and/or values to situations.  
In this research, the author is concerned about the lenses through which individuals 
perceive events, expectations and meanings regarding a situation. The approach that is chosen 
tries to elicit: 
✓  the participants’ views of their working environment and  
✓ the events that they experienced or observed. 
Hence, the study is focusing in contending and overlapping versions of reality and 
include as many truths as possible (Rubin & Rubin, 2011).  
Similarly, the fact that it is not considered one universal truth that does not mean that 
generalizability is not reached. What the research is ought to understand is everyday 
moderatum generalizations and if they are conceived then it is known the consistency of the 
reality within which they reside (Williams, 2000). The interpretation of an utterance lead to an 
understanding of why it happened (Bryman, 2003).  
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The objective of the qualitative assessment is to focus on depth the theoretical linkages 
that are purposed in this study in the aim to understand how they manifest under specific 
situations, individuals and moments in time in order to reveal this theoretical gap on ethical 
decision making (Rubin & Rubin, 2011).  
The qualitative paradigm will significantly help in answering the overall research question 
not quantify the phenomenon though understand the context in which it manifests.  
Consequently, the research was conducted using in-depth open ended semi structured 
interviews. Semi structured topical interviews are important data technique in order to explore 
questions of what, when, how and why. Even if the interviews follow a list of topics, that were 
prepared in advance, the style of the interview were more responsive by adding questions in 
order to obtain detailed and in-depth answers (Rubin & Rubin, 2011).  
The sample size in qualitative research is much smaller than the one in quantitative. 
This is because in-depth interview method is not concerned with making generalizations to a 
larger population and does not rely on hypothesis testing but mostly is more emergent in its 
process.   
While the majority of experts in qualitative research are avowing to state how many 
interviews are enough there is variability that suggest a minimum. A significant number of 
research articles recommend that anywhere from 5 to 50 participants are adequate. This range 
is considered adequate as (Dworkin, 2012): 
➢ allows for thorough examination of the elements that address the research question and 
to separate conceptual categories of interest 
➢ maximizes the possibility that enough data have been collected to clarify relationships 
between conceptual categories and identify variation in processes, 
➢ maximizes the chances that negative cases and hypothetical negative cases have been 
explored in the data. 
This study involves looking at top mid-level managers in large multinational 
companies. Apart from the biases linked with the collection of data from these participants, it 
is also challenging to gain useful number to interview, especially within the wide 
heterogeneous geographical context of this study (Brazil, UK, Italy, France/Venezuela, 
Greece).  
Therefore, due to the geographical spread, the time constrains, as well as the individual 
factors of each participant, it was very challenging to get sufficient and credible sample. 
Luckily, after several reminders five people were interviewed for this research, including 2 
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pilot interviews, that is enough to demonstrate balance and thoroughness of the examined 
aspects (Rubin & Rubin, 2011).   
The factor of heterogeneity of the population that the sample was drawn is vital to 
capture the variability in experiences and views in regard to the examined linkages (Baker, 
Edwards, & Doidge, 2012). Although, a level of homogeneity exists when it comes to the 
managerial level of the participants, the range of responsibilities, the age (40 to 50) and the 
multinational level of each firm.  
Participants Profile: 
➢ Communications Manager in international insurance company from Swiss (Sao 
Paolo) 
➢ Client Engagement Manager in multinational of luxury goods from France 
(Paris) 
➢ Regional Manager in multinational specialist supplier from UK (Madrid) 
➢ Operations Manager recently corporate director in multinational 
logistics/freight forwarded from Italy (Florence) 
➢ Regional Club Manager in international chain of luxury health clubs from UK 
(Athens) 
 
4.2 Research design approach based on aims and objectives 
The study aims to understand better “what”, “when”, “how” and “why” in terms of 
bounded ethicality processes and the manifestations of certain psychological traps in them. The 
qualitative research in this case is more reasonable as it raises various experiences and views 
within the decision making scene of middle management. As such, the study follows abductive 
reasoning in order to create necessary linkages and re-conceptualize the represent the 
relationship between the theoretical frameworks and existing research.  
Here, the research incorporates both the deductive a priori template of themes - which 
are constructed based on preliminary scanning of the theoretical perspectives - and the data-
driven inductive reasoning (Schurz, 2008). The process of the research based on the research 
questions and objectives follows the below hybrid structure shown in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. The Abductive Research Process 
 
 
4.3 Primary sources of data 
The literature acknowledges that primary data refer to the ones that are collected by the 
researcher whereas secondary are provided by other professional sources that are vital as the 
main research cannot involve everything in the collection (Bryman & Bell, 2015). More 
precisely, primary data are collected using a list of topics discussed with private sector middle 
managers in in-depth semi structured interviews via Skype to capture the context of the 
linkages.  
The data were collected the first trimester of 2018 and all managers were interviewed 
by skype in their offices as it was requested to them and to their company. The average time 
that each interview lasted around 50 to 70 minutes depending on the answers of the participants. 
The data were recorded and later transcribed and /or translated since some of the interviews 
were in Greek and Portuguese.  
 
4.4 Interview design  
 In this part we will present the interview design of the research, the list of topics and 
the coding scheme.  
Mainly three types of topics/questions are formulated for this research: 
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➢ attitudinal in order to identify how middle managers feel on certain topics of fair 
procedures within their company and also to estimate long-standing beliefs on certain 
procedural issues. These questions are formulated to obtain reflections and thick 
descriptions and not fixed statements. In this first segment there are also scaling 
questions in order to evaluate fairness and procedural justice within their close working 
environment and their organization overall. 
➢ The second type of topic/questions are tour questions that request to provide a broad 
description of their activities and also behavioral that refer to the frequency of a 
specific behavior regarding common decision making processes and ethical decision 
making processes. These questions are able to help respondents remember events 
where their values or their decisions abilities were tested.  
➢ Lastly, inspired by (Hammond et al., 2006) book, the researcher develops a list of 
questions related to each psychological trap trying to foresee or identify tendencies of 
the individuals on the examined hidden traps.   
The objective of the interviews is to investigate in depth how middle-level managers cope 
with justice issues in decision making and to make connections with the chosen literature on 
hidden traps in order to discover the context of the manifestations of the traps in ethical decision 
making. In this way it can be possible to understand and isolate complex behaviors and their 
motivators in ethical decisions making (Belk, Fischer, & Kozinets, 2012). 
Each manager identified characteristics regarding decision making process in three topics: 
a. general background and procedural justice; 
b. decision making process segmented into four different pillars: 
a. Anchoring trap 
b. Status quo trap 
c. Framing trap 
d. Sunk cost trap 
c. challenging decision making related to ethics at workplace and procedural justice;  
 
The interview protocol was designed to encourage participants to share basic background 
information and also to evaluate transparency and fairness of processes in their current 
company or in their previous working experience and the current close working environment.  
In a second phase, they are asked to provide information about their general decision 
making processes at work with each question designed to identify the examined traps.  
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The interview then progressed through separate questions about ethical decisions making 
at work and concludes with questions about the interviewee’s process of making decisions 
related to their actual organizational structure and their perception of justice within the work 
place.  
The logic behind the protocol of the interviews is that by not following a continuous stream 
for describing the process of decision making would minimize the need of the participant to 
fall in social desirable biases for self-improvement (Fernandes & Randall, 1992). This type of 
interplay (experience, induction, deduction) sets a vital element for allowing news issues to 
emerge (Glasser & Strauss, 1967). 
All interviews are transcribed in order to facilitate the collection of the data for this study. 
The purpose is to gather data and isolate the ones that determine the examined re-
conceptualizations of the theories and themes thus the data analysis is based on an abductive 
research design. While thematic analysis is utilized to understand the given information 
regarding the participants decision making process (Boyatzis, 1998). 
The process is separated into three segments: 
• Transcription and isolation of themes: the objective is to identify and isolate 
thoughts thus the interviews were ranged from simple words and phrases to entire 
sentences.  
• Coding the data according to the each thematic. The coding scheme is presented 
on findings.  
• Determine patterns by comparing within and across categories. In essence, 
distinguishing key factors in which the examined linkages are identified. 
 
Figure 7.  Coding scheme development (Boyatzis 1998) 
 
1. Randomly number subjects and remove names from transcripts. Record pertinent information in records. Make 
transcripts blind 
2. Read through transcripts and create outline for each subject on each question. Create sub-samples here (e.g., 
those who recognized ethical decision and those who did not) 
3. Use outlines to identify themes in each sub-group of subject responses. Specific definition isn’t necessary here, 
just any glimmer of themes 
4. Re-write themes that are consistent across subjects in subsample; possible labels may come up here 
5. Themes that show distinctions between sub-samples are rewritten again for clarity and parsimony. Re-read 
original transcripts—each theme should clearly be either present or absent 
6. Develop the code: Assign a label to each theme; define it clearly; record indicators ‘‘Coded when subject stated 
abc…’’ or ‘‘xyz…’’; note differentiation in each subject (NOT sub-sample but all subjects)—i.e., subjects 1 and 5 
showed theme, subjects2, 3, 4, 8 did not show them 
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4.5 Limitations 
One of the main limitations of qualitative research is the difficulty to generalize the 
findings for a greater population.  
Due to lack of time and resources, the primary research conducted is solely based on 
in-depth interviews. Furthermore, a boundary condition of the study is the level of induced 
ethics. Processing effects of extremely high levels of emotions in ethical behavior are not 
examined, which unavoidably limits the findings.  
In the first step, the analysis of perceptual traps can be restrictive for the validity of the 
qualitative analysis as the idea of choice and biases can differ even individually, as a result a 
holistic view might be limited. Moreover, the execution of the interviews provides a valuable 
insight on the way these middle level actors perform different roles within the organizations. 
Though can be restrictive for the accuracy of the existing situation within companies and the 
perception of procedural justice and morality.  
As mentioned before, the lack of time, and lack of contact with such persons, considers 
such kind of information unavailable and therefore it should be considered as a limiting factor 
to the outcome of the research. The latter factors, indicate the need to emphasize on well-
structured questions for the in-depth interviews and consequently a profound support of the 
results with academic research models and the given literature so far.  
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Chapter 5: Presentation of findings and discussion 
 
In this chapter all interview results are collected and combined with the theoretical 
constructs. Firstly, it is presented a general overview on the key elements of the findings as 
well as a table on the themes and the categories in which the analysis was based. On a second 
and last step, each theme and sub-category is examined with the relevant case of bounded 
ethicality as it was stated on the analysis from chapter 3. The purpose is to present one by one 
how the linkages manifest on the participants’ behavior.  
 
5.1 Findings 
The key question in this study is to: To apply concepts of psychological traps to situations 
of ethical choice of middle managers, to reveal potential causes of unethical decisions and to 
provide recommendations to avoid these mistakes. 
The analysis of the in-depth interviews yielded around 110 pieces of nominal data which 
were organized in five categories that represented the interview themes and then analyzed 
based on the linkages created thus organized into the five constructs of bounded ethicality.    
As mentioned, the five categories of data pertained to the philosophy of each question and 
of the collected information accordingly. The primary focus of the interviews had to do with 
the information relating to authority bias and extensively in procedural (in)justice with several 
sub-categories like nepotism, ethical values and so on and also with specific influences of 
psychological traps on the decision making process.  
Any relationship between the themes and ethics was anticipated and - as observed – 
resulted from each subject’s responses and that was as well the intent of the research. The 
discussion of the themes is intended to underline key findings on traps and organizational 
fairness, mainly as they pertain to the theoretical linkages and the existing research on ethical 
decision making. In Figure 8 are illustrated and includes all theme names, category names and 
sub-categories as well as examples from participants’ responses for each theme. In the table 
there are fragments of the arguments of each participant that correspond to each sub-category. 
This method of combing the data facilitates the separation of each answer and the 
categorization of them on the concepts that were used for the design of the interviews that 
correspond to the concepts of psychological traps and the authority bias.  
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Figure 8. Themes and categories derived from interviews 
 
5.1.1 Implicit ethical attitudes and framing trap 
An analysis of the first theme reveals the presence of implicit attitudes. This appears as 
the main characteristics of the latter are present in the responses of the participants. As 
mentioned earlier in the literature analysis one main key characteristic of implicit ethical 
attitudes is automaticity and thus yield specific forms of behaviors (Wilson et al., 2000). One 
of the main characteristics is spontaneous stereotyped reactions. The latter manifests on the 
participants’ responses as managers 1,2 and 3 react similarly when a problem is framed in terms 
of gains and losses thus if a given situation results positive outcomes regardless the context 
Themes & Sub-categories Part. Examples 
Framing  
General Problems  
   Contribution on problem framed 
by peers/colleagues  
Gains vs Losses  
 Gains/Positive outcome 
 Losses/negative outcome  
Reference Points  
#2 
#2 
#4 
 
#2 
#1 
#3 
"No. I just take it as it is. Because it is easier"  
" I'll make sure that whatever calculations they did is accurate"  
"I will give my support. That's for sure."  
 
“Yes, I'll take this risk. [...] It's inevitable."  
"I think this is difficult to handle. I'll try to do anything to avoid losing something."  
"I would refer back to my boss or my colleague down here in the office. "  
Status quo  
Unconventional situations  
Endowment effect  
   Familiarity & comfort 
#1 
 
#2 
#3 
" […] a decision could be more assertive instead of thinking in a bad way"  
 
"I would stick to what the current status of a decision offers"  
"I would stick to the principle decision made"  
Anchoring  
  
Anchored by others  
  First reaction to a problem  
Anchoring others  
   Communicating subjective 
estimations  
Anchored by own experience 
Thinking the opposite or extremes  
 
#4 
 
#1 
 
#2 
#1 
 
"I coordinate with our people and I hear their opinion, their thoughts. "  
 
"As much as possible. As much as they have the information, it's easier to analyze, and the risk 
of having a bad decision is lower"  
"I make assumptions and then I build this estimate. Based on my experience "  
"I try to avoid the extremes. I think extremes are not good at all "  
 
Sunk cost  
Escalation  
   The hole paradigm  
Negative assessment  
    Admitting mistakes  
    Devil's advocate  
Self-esteem  
    Support subjective views  
 
 
#4 
#2 
#4 
#4 
 
#2 
 
 
"I would try to dig"  
"No. it's not easy for anybody to admit mistakes. It's stressful!"  
"I prefer not to be criticized but I know that it can happen"  
"No, I don't have such a person, luckily"  
 
"Yes. Because it's what we all do. Because at the end you do what you believe is right"  
Authority bias 
Awareness  
Justice of process from I to 5 
   Current company  
    Previous working experience  
    Close working environment  
Justice of outcome 
    Right violation & nepotism  
    Personal experience  
Ethical values 
    Directly stated or not  
    Dilemmas  
    Positive outcomes vs ethicality 
#1 
 
#5 
#3 
#5 
 
#1 
#3 
 
#1 
#2 
#2 
" probably are not as transparent as from outside"  
 
"Three. Because there are too many procedures (in which transparency does not exist)"  
“Three. The whole industry is based on levels of trust. This is an industry open to abuse’” 
“Four., I can never be 100% sure that everything is done in full transparency."  
 
"Yes, but I try to control myself as much as possible.'"  
" managing people. Because they can get upset for no reason, or for valid reasons.” 
 
"Non-directly, yes. There is no guidance."  
"Instead of making our guide aware, I got the opportunity to learn all this valuable data."  
"I think people would bend the rules a little I guess. If there is a positive outcome of bending 
the rules."  
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and the consequence participants answered that they will take the risk. More precisely manager 
2 responded: 
  “Yes, I'll take this risk. Because you have to take risks in order to gain something. It's 
inevitable.” On the other hand, is the decision is posed in term of losses manager 1 mentioned 
that: “I think this is difficult to handle. I’ll try to do anything to avoid losing something.”  
 
First, it is observed and confirmed the theory of framing in which people are biased 
from estimations of outcomes as they seem to develop a certain conceptualization of an 
outcome because it was judged as positive or negative. Second, and most crucial for this 
research the subjects were unaware of the ethical dimensions of their responses reacting 
automatically, intuitively and without putting effort to the framed situation confirming the 
theory of implicit ethical attitudes of spontaneous behaviors.  
When it comes on reframing given general problems or problems that are stated under 
specific point of views, in this case solely financial, participants 2 and 4 are not providing any 
form of contribution or alternative to the framed situation. The literature recognizes the latter 
fragility of managers to be biased by financial frames on certain decision making processes. 
The lack of vigilance in these situations is contradicting their role as middle managers. They 
are responsible to change and reformulate duties and challenges and not simply monitoring the 
decision processes (Pappas & Wooldridge, 2007).  
Accordingly, implicit ethical attitudes yield non-verbal behaviors and effortless 
attitudes. The fact that the situation was framed in a certain manner increased the implicit 
attitude of the participants towards a stereotyped effortless reaction. Framing trap theory states 
that reference points can become anchors of the frame as they pose the subjects to search the 
same question though most likely in homogenous environment that will result the same 
outcome. The latter, activates implicit mental processes that derive from instincts.   
Similarly, participants 1, 2, 3 and 4 mention the necessity to use reference points in the 
same context and likely with the same point of view. Particularly, participant 3 mentions that: 
 “I would refer back to my boss or my colleague down here in the office. If we feel that 
we're going down a path that's not going to be profitable, we won't go down that path”.  
 
The latter, first reveals that the frame is posed again on financial aspects, no other angle 
is viewed. Additionally, the participant mentions feelings thus a tendency or intuition towards 
a specific outcome - even if the reference points are seemingly different. Thus, the framing 
bias activates instincts even more. On the same manner, implicit ethical attitudes are intuitive 
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and operate in similar ways as the produce behaviors whereas the individual attributes specific 
categorizations and judgements outside his/her conscious awareness.   
On the other hand, manager 5 presented an attitude that can be argued is more closely 
to what one can do to avoid frames on homogenous environments and thus decrease implicit 
ethical behaviors. Participant 5 mentions: 
 “I refer to other people yes, but most of the time there are no people from the company 
or at least close working environment that advise me. Because I want people who have an 
objective picture, different from my everyday life. People who are not emotionally influenced 
by everyday life. They face life more clearly and not based on certain intuitions.”  
 
It can be argued that through the interviews it is evident the fact that framing is able to 
increase the effects of implicit ethical attitudes on individuals’ behavior. The first Linkage in 
which: The more a manager is prone to framing problems the more likely she/he will depend 
on implicit ethical attitudes is confirmed. There is an effortless attitude towards framed 
problems that inevitably leads to implicit ethical behavior. And in which the participants might 
be totally unaware. 
Similarly, as it was presented on chapter 3, managers of Morgan Stanley had a certain 
framed idea of a successful broker and that lead them to categorizations based on gender or 
race. That does not mean that the managers personal beliefs are based on these categorizations 
though the framed idea of what is consider a success story in their industry lead them to 
unethical gender considerations.  
 
5.1.2 Egocentrism and status quo trap 
Liable results are yielded as well from status quo trap categories and the effect of the trap 
on egocentrism. In particular, it was mentioned in the literature analysis on chapter 3 that 
individuals are even more pulled to status quo under an unconventional situation that offers 
necessary space to upset the status quo. Participants 1 and 3 are prone to this bias as 
incompatible situations, that set their status quo in peril, can be adjusted to what they perceive 
it should be attributed to them or to their company. In parallel, as egocentrism states, they 
adjust situations to their feeling of deservingness that is dominant in their own environment. 
For example, manager 1 states that: 
“If you are in the middle of a situation that makes yourself not comfortable. I say that the 
companies are ‘fomenting’... Thus, a decision could be more assertive, serving you and the 
company instead of thinking in a bad way”.  
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That indicates that if an individual feels uncomfortable because the current status quo is 
exposed to a shift - but the organizational structure instigates towards an assertive way of 
thinking - then the managers are inclined to what is favorable for their part, to what actually 
they deserve to keep or to get. On that note participant 3 mentions: 
“you can choose to be difficult and regal in order to reduce losses but my bigger picture in 
this current position, is will I make profit in the long term? Why should I shift?  you've got 
people to recognize the value of your brand or yourself and you persevere forward with it. As 
soon as people got trust in it you will turn that into a benefit for you and the company 
eventually.”  
 
Patterns of status quo bias are underscored in the second thematic which includes decisions 
that provide comfort and familiarity. The theory of psychological traps presents the magnetic 
relationship of individuals on retaining their current position that provides certain level of 
comfort to them (Hammond et al., 2006).  
In this research, the latter phenomenon is present as the endowment affect that sets the 
exact same requirement that people hang on what they already own (DYE et al., 2003). The 
latter is revealed directly in managers 1, 2 and 3. More precisely participant 1and 2 respectively 
recognize that:  
“I would be comfortable with the first situation, and I'll go ahead, I have to guarantee that 
I'm absolutely comfortable with that"  
“I would stick to the what the current status of a decision offers”.  
Lastly, participant 3 refers to that “I would stick to the principle position, yes. The reason 
for that is that you need to achieve the balance for yourself. They need to make a living but you 
need to make a living as well. That's the reason why I would make a decision like that.” 
 
As explained previously on egocentrism, the tendency to trust the feeling of familiarity on 
a given situation is triggered subsequently and thus interpreted egocentrically (Epley & Caruso, 
2004). Therefore, it is evident from the data that the participants are attached to their status quo 
bias and by that they are increasing the effect of egocentrism on them. Hence, the second 
Linkage: The more a manager is prone to status quo problems the more likely to be controlled 
from egocentrism is reliable.  
Returning to the business scandal on egocentrism from chapter 3, Anderson’s managers 
interpreted the data of Enron’s in a way that their status quo is not upset. That means that the 
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consulting services that they offered to Enron are not altered and they still retain their option 
to job offers in their client’s company. Clearly, the idea of relying to the current state of affairs 
with Enron lead them to an egocentric behavior and thus resulted to a huge scandal that left 
exposed both companies.  
 
5.1.3 Ethical uncertainty and anchoring bias 
Similarly, the analysis continues on the consistency of the linkages regarding 
anchoring. This trap is heavily related to insufficient adjustments towards an initial estimation 
or assumption which is based mainly on a past event (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). 
 In the data, it is observed that participants 2 and 4 as well as 1 are anchored by their 
own experience and they create their estimations based on these assumptions. More precisely, 
manager 2 mentioned that: 
  “I make assumptions and then I build this estimate. Based on my experience”.  
 
Accordingly, the subject falls intentionally under one description that is based on a past 
event which is part of his personal experience. The theory of ethical uncertainty suggests that 
under such descriptions the degree of belief regarding what is ethical certain irrupts (Bykvist, 
2017). The latter can apply also when the decision maker is providing his own estimations to 
others. Based on (Hammond et al., 2006) the more information regarding subjective 
estimations are given to third parties the more likely the individual will be anchoring them.  
In the research, participants 1, 2, 3 and 4 support that they tend to share as much as 
possible their estimations, namely 2 states that:  
“Yes. Definitely as much as possible, so that others understand my point. Because 
otherwise they are not going to be able to give me solutions right, intelligent solutions”.  
Whereas, solely manger 5 stated something very different that in fact supports the 
existing theory on how to avoid anchoring others. More precisely it is stated that: “It depends 
on who you have, to whom you give information, and based on the subject."1  
 
Moreover, the last category of the coding refers to “thinking the opposite or the 
extremes” which according to Kahneman is the way to avoid anchors. That is underlined in the 
                                                 
1 Participant 5: “Many times you do not have to give too much information to the group of people you are addressing, because 
they will get confused or scare them even more by your own estimations. If it is something that can be treated differently and 
everyone can have the complete picture because this will help to achieve our goal, then I provide all the information. It depends 
on the subject and the people you are addressing to.” 
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literature as individuals tend to move around the anchor constantly related to a certain medley 
of thoughts or as supported in this research by certain “ought” (Epley & Gilovich, 2001).  
Correspondingly, ethical uncertainty as mentioned on previous chapter is driven by 
compulsory “ought” (Jackson & Smith, 2006). Hence, it is observed from mainly participants 
1, 3 and 4 that they ought to react in a certain manner when considering alternatives. By doing 
adjustments, manager 4, around an ought situation of hers is not considering the extremes, thus 
anchors herself and rejects the decision-ought which to be expected by her. In other words, she 
does not consider a holistic response to given problems that her company expects.  More 
precisely, participant 4 states that:  
“No, I never consider the extremes, because I am just an employee.” whereas subject 4 
in a different part of the interview contradicts the above statement: “the company expects for 
me to propose alternatives and actually the most unlikely to happen”. 
 
Therefore, it is likely that under anchors participants’ uncertainty regarding ethical 
beliefs is increased. The third Linkage states that: The more managers are staying close to their 
anchors the more likely to suffer from ethical uncertainty and that is confirmed based on the 
participants’ reactions.  
 Similarly, it was presented in chapter 3 the example of Wells Fargo. Regional managers 
of Wells Fargo did not consider the consequences of setting up accounts without the consent 
of their clients which exposed them to an ethical uncertain situation. The fact that they stayed 
closer to the anchor of meeting sales target of previous year in order to be more competitive 
left them exposed to an ethical uncertain situation. Even if the company tried to avoid great 
pitfalls of other big banks, even if they provided incentives for their managers in order to 
increase cross-selling, the company did not clarify the terms in which their managers could 
process their decisions making. Hence, the company did not justify which actions are ethical 
certain or uncertain and that left them exposed to the scandal that followed.  
 
 
5.1.4 Cognitive ethical dissonance and sunk cost trap 
The concept of sunk cost is activated due to escalation of commitment to failing 
attempts (Arkes & Blumer, 1985). The latter characteristic is present in the majority of the 
participants. Firstly, in the question - inspired by the famous quote of investor Warren Buffet 
- “If you find yourself in a hole what is most likely to happen?” participants 1, 2, 3 and 4 
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answered that they will continue digging confirming the sunk cost trap whereas again manager 
5 responded in a different way: 
 “If there is light above me, I will go up, I will not continue digging. But if I continue 
digging means going to the light, I will continue to dig. However, stopping and doing nothing 
is not an option?”.  
 
The hole example reveals the tendency of individuals to escalate unhealthy situations. 
Similarly, stretching the truth or shuffling the facts irrupts while constantly digging to evoke 
more comfort regarding an outcome of a situation (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). The 
analysis considers “self-serving altruism” as another construct of cognitive ethical dissonance 
where wrong behaviors can be justified as right when they benefit one’s view of self-image or 
when they are assigned to benefit another individual or situation (Erat & Gneezy, 2012).  
In the research, the latter is indirectly seen through answers of subjects on the question 
regarding problems that lie on a wounded self-esteem. Particularly, participants 1,2,3 and 4 
instinctively they are looking an approval to justify that an action was correct though by 
presenting it subjectively as the right one – manager 2: 
 “my decision should be confirmed to a common sense of people that I will share 
because it's what we all do. Because at the end you do what you believe is right even if it is not 
aligned with the common sense. It’s fine because you can benefit others”  
 
In this sense is observed that a personal decision should be justified by others as right 
first because the individual needs support that serves his self-image and also indicates the 
rightfulness of the decision.  Although, it can be wrong but again since it serves the subjective 
will and probably others, it can be characterized as right in their mind. Though it is not indicated 
by the participants if it actually happened to be wrong or unethical. Therefore, it is not clear if 
they presented a wrong behavior as right to serve their self-image as the theory of self-serving 
attitude supports, definitely though they are subjected to sunk cost trap. One more element of 
ethical dissonance recognized previously is moral hypocrisy. The latter refers to a distant 
behavior regarding judgements of a mistake or incapacity of admitting self-violations 
(Rustichini & Villeval, 2014).  
The agony of admitting mistakes activates as well sunk cost traps and in the data it is 
found that participants 1, 2, 4 and 5 are unable to admit mistakes or in some cases even to 
receive any form of criticism. Manager 5 stated:  
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“I'm having a very hard time, which I have been working on lately, to accept when I'm 
wrong” while manager 2 said “No. it's not easy for anybody to admit mistakes. It's stressful.”  
 
Moreover, in the question “Having a person or more to play devils’ advocate built better 
reasoning for your decisions? If yes, why?” participant 4 answered: 
“No, I don't have such a person, luckily. I prefer not to be criticized” while subject 1 
strongly stated “why should I have to handle with her or him? I would have a catch-up with 
this guy or this woman, try to come to an agreement, and try to understand why he or she is 
behaving against me like this”.  
 
Indeed, most of the subjects are neglecting negative assessment which increases their 
distant attitude. Therefore, from the analysis it comes that the participants are subjected to sunk 
cost traps and also their behavior in this situation falls under the processes of cognitive ethical 
dissonance. In conclusion, the fourth Linkage where:  The more managers are prone to the 
sunk cost trap the more likely will suffer failures of cognitive ethical dissonance is confirmed.  
In the same way, the example of Volkswagen of ethical licensing can be explained here 
on the basis of the latter linkage. The engineering managers failed to develop a machine 
acceptable to the standards of emissions in America. Instead they kept investing in a production 
of 11 million cars that had a mechanism that could cheat the emissions test. The sunk cost 
fallacy is present in this scandal as the managers kept following an investment that was wrong 
from the beginning, that was against the laws of a country and all that because they did want 
to accept their failure to develop a production line that was adjustable to the requirements. This 
resulted to an ethical self-licensing effect engaging a whole group of managers in virtuous acts 
in the light of previous ethicality. Volkswagen was considered first in CSR policies in the auto 
motive industry till that point.  
 
 
 
5.1.5 Authority bias and ethical erosion 
In this last chapter the analysis is focused on one of the most critical variables of this 
study – authority bias and the procedural (in)justice effect. The following constructs are 
examined: the perception of fairness, the ethical values, the justice of outcome and process are 
integral constructs of procedural justice that were identified as subcategories of authority bias 
and procedural (in)justice during the coding process of the interviews.  
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Firstly, when it comes to awareness of the structure and the processes of each company 
none of the participants were profoundly aware and some of them completely unaware 
whereas, others were merely informed when they entered the company and then changed their 
perception. Participant 1 says:  
“we all have information from outside, but can be different when you start your own 
work. Knowing some other new things from the company that probably are not as transparent 
as from outside” during the interview subject 1 expressed ambivalently on this matter with clear 
hesitation to expand his thoughts. Whereas participant 2 and 4 added:  
“I got the job through networking. Organizational structure and procedures weren't my 
concern” and “I was totally unaware” respectively. Whereas subject 5 says: 
 “When I joined this company I didn't knew about the way it worked, the only thing I 
knew and was the biggest motivation for me to join, was that it was the best of its kind in 
Greece.”  
 
To summarize, it is observed a clear unawareness of what subjects evaluate to be the 
structure of their company and the procedures in their work unit, as well as lack of attention on 
how they understand fairness and transparency as participant 1 mentioned.  Based on theory of 
authority bias and consequently procedural (in)justice demonstrating to the employees a fair 
authority behavior can coerce a desirable behavior from them as well. It is observed that the 
managers have complete unawareness of the credibility of the authority figures and their 
company in a bigger picture.  
 On a second question participants were asked to evaluate in a scale from 1 to 5 the 
justice of processes in three different levels, on their current company, on their previous 
experience in the industry and their close working environment/their team. Regarding the 
current working environment manager 5 supports “three. Because there are too many parts - 
there are too many procedures executed with transparency, but in others this does not exist.” 2 
Whereas participants 1 and 4 are more anchored in their answers as they both evaluate 
with three though they try to justify by coming back to what the company is and the difficulties 
of it, revealing the significant effect that authority bias has on them. More precisely, manager 
1 states:  
                                                 
2 Participant 5: “And the way things are done, is not based on procedures, or the procedures followed - which I will not call 
them procedures - do not involve transparency or justice. They contain personal considerations, personal sympathies or 
dislikes, personal interests.” 
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“It is a group of three or four business units. In some countries, we have just two 
business units. In some other countries, four. It depends on the strategy that the group has. In 
general, I think to operate a very complicated structure as we have and working in general 
well, we can give three”.  
 
Here, it is important to state that the majority of the participants they were interviewed 
in their office environment. Thus, they may felt uncomfortable to give clear and justifiable 
responses and their evaluation and explanation might be biased. The pressure of the 
surroundings is demonstrated as well on Milgram’s (1974) experiment where participants were 
subjected to the authority bias, and the pressure of the surrounding lead them into unethical 
actions.  To summarize, the outcome of the evaluation of processes in the company of each 
participant inclines to three with two answers at four.  
Moving to their evaluation of their previous experience managers 4 and 5 since they 
both started and continued in their current companies did not give different evaluations, 
participant 2 having an experience in multinational companies in South America and more 
precisely in Venezuela he continued to the other questions by mocking the question in an ironic 
manner. Whereas managers 1 and 3 stated respectively:  
“I could say around three.3[…] when you have the potential to establish yourself 
working for a company, the process, tends to become more fair actually.” and  “It's a three. The 
whole industry is based on levels of trust. This is an industry that is open to abuse.” 
respectively. To summarize this part, it is evident that again the evaluation of the fairness of 
processes is significantly low inclining more towards three.  
 
Lastly, when it comes to the close working environment the parameters change and the 
subjects appear optimistic while contradicting themselves with previous statements. It is 
appeared that the current company and the past working experience or the whole industry are 
evaluated to around three whereas their team receives five. Solely manger 5 is more restrained 
by stating that it is: “four. Because I can never say five, I can never be 100% sure that 
everything is done in full transparency.” 4 
 
                                                 
3 Participant 1: “During these almost 20 years in the market, I got the opportunity to work for several companies.  I got the 
potential to work for an American company, for two Europeans company, and one Japanese also. All those companies have a 
very well organized structure that you might consider that whole process is fair, but in fact not the whole process is fair.” 
4 Participant 5: “This is something too perfect, if it is from one to five. So the perfect one is a bit difficult - even to believe it - 
to define it and say it is five. You will always have some doubts.” 
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Therefore, as a general observation it can be argued that it is evident that the standards 
of evaluation of processes change when they come closer to their self-image, the more distant 
the question is from them the more objective or harsh are in their responses. 
In this part, they are analyzed two categories as coded from the interviews: rights 
violation and nepotism in the general processes of each company and more in –depth examples 
of a personal experience of an event or procedure that its process and outcome posed strong 
emotions to the subjects. When it comes to rights violation and nepotism managers 1,3 and 5 
mentioned that they observed unjustifiable outcomes that in some cases created ambivalent 
emotions and reactions. Particularly, participant 1 stated: 
 “Yes I experienced, but I try to control myself as much as possible.” 5and participant 3 
adds “From a managerial point of view, if an issue happens it's completely out of your control 
and upsetting”.  
 
The theory of authority bias states that compliance to the unfairness is strongly yielded 
by the desire to avoid any social exclusion from the group. Similarly, ethical erosion that 
evokes through the slippery slope effect, suggest that individuals nonverbally cooperate in 
injustice. A more insightful response comes from participant 5: “Now we're talking about the 
mother company. […] There is no transparency, there. […] But that is - that is what we said 
earlier, you think in the long run what ultimate consequences this will have. That is, I prefer to 
make things, to be creative, to develop them, and the success of these things will necessarily 
come out. Now if you take it, afterwards, you will arrogate it and present it as yours, that is 
something that I cannot avoid. I have no way of protecting it.” 6  
The participant 5 even if she is exposed to unfairness and corrupted behaviors coming 
from authority figures she supports a more positive approach compering to the other 
participants. She is not inclined to the slippery slope fallacy though she is exposed to an ethical 
dilemma on how to cope with this. It evident that the authority figures leave her no choice 
rather than comply to the unfairness.  
 In the case of Participant 5 it was added an additional question regarding where she 
sees profit when her ideas are arrogated by others and she continued: “The direct profit today 
                                                 
5 Participant 1: “It is hard to be mad and try to behave as shouting and by-laws, or these kind of things. People will consider 
you immature.” 
6 Participant 5: “The only way to protect and safeguard it, is to make it widely known from the beginning before you come and 
get it from me. That it is mine, anyway. And then you will come and get it, necessarily, you will protect it, you will put a nice 
label over it and a nice logo, and you will say it is yours, I cannot avoid that. But history has proven, in the long run, everyone 
knows who has done the job, everyone knows to whom they owe some gratitude, and in the end everyone accepts it. You must 
see the profit every time.” 
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is that I have a position that I earned, because I did a lot of work that some people arrogate it 
[…] Inevitably and necessarily and while there was so much resistance to evolve, some things 
are what they are, and they all admit it. You do not immediately see much profit, though in the 
long run the profit comes because you gain experience. You have responsibilities that go 
beyond the limits of the role, because you do everything and you are for everything. This is an 
experience that is not paid.” 7  
 
It is important to include this perception as she subjected to the slippery slope fallacy 
even if she exposed to the authority bias. Instead, she sees a positive outcome derived from 
(in)justice towards her objectives in the company. The latter will be used to provide later 
recommendations on how to suffer less the authority bias and eventually avoid unethical 
decisions.  
The main complaint of participant 5 focused on the silent inaction of the company in 
these cases of unfair behaviors, leaving the impressions that the company lets managers to 
arrogate others’ ideas as they seek for the general profit of the implementation of a decision 
though do not provide a safe environment of fair process on the changes and the decision 
making.  
Participant 5 states that: “if the company wanted to intervene, it would have intervened. 
The company is made up of people. The company is not impersonal. So, people who could 
intervene, if they want to intervene and they can, at any time. If they do not, that means that 
they do not want to. But they know. The company is not an intangible thing.” 
 
 Whereas in the same mangers 2 and 4 are contradicting previous statements by 
supporting that it is very difficult to see nepotism or rights violation in their companies when 
it can be argued that their recruitment process cannot be seen as fair to other mangers or 
employees. Participant 2 recruited via networking and 4 was a friend of the CEO from which 
she was interviewed in order to enter the company. Linked to the previous statements and 
moving to personal experience of unfair outcomes manager 1 says that: 
                                                 
7 Participant 5: “You see one thing that from day one is born, from scratch, and you give it shape. You form it, and because 
these people cannot give shape, it is proven that they cannot, they give you the opportunity because you can do it. No matter 
if they want subconsciously to take it from you, you know that. From the beginning, you know it. But you have what is yours, 
no one can steal it. It depends, it's up to everyone's personality because at the beginning you can be in shock. About six years 
ago, when I started doing this job, but today because you know what is reality and you've been shielded, it has no moral impact 
because it cannot affect you. It cannot damage you, since it has not altered you, it will not damage you now. Simply, it's a 
lasting battle, but as time goes on because you become more capable of fighting, it has less losses for you and more losses for 
the opposite. This is how it's done.” 
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 “I became really mad in a specific situation8 […] in that kind of situation, you have to 
control yourself and try to manage as much as possible to avoid any struggling.”  
While subject 5 continues more in-depth explaining that “there is no difficult decision 
or event that created strong emotion, there is perhaps a situation and handling that situation, 
that was not pleasant. You confront an already established situation, and you know that you 
will face many obstacles, it is not very pleasant9. […] But, of course, after that you remain 
with the internal tension and the conflicts that have been created when you try to change a 
fixed state, established within years”. 
 
Therefore, it is observed that as participant 1 and 5 stated there are established situations 
that are difficult and unpleasant to handle. These situations set the subjects to a significantly 
uncomfortable situation where they need to decide if they are going comply to the processes as 
they were forced by authority figures or if they are going to make a difference and start to 
implement a change as subject 5 did.  
In the last category of the analysis the subjects were asked to answer a list of questions 
that are linked to ethical values and dilemmas that they might face and are connected with their 
perception and evaluation of fairness in their industry and in their company. As mentioned 
previously in the theory, high levels of procedural justice are able to build cognitive confidence 
and thus commitment, trust, loyalty and other principles that can create a stable social fabric in 
the work unit (Kim & Mauborgne, 1998).  
As a start point the subject were asked to identify if ethical values, regarding decision 
making, are directly given through guidance by the company or not. More precisely if actually 
the company gives space to question the ethical consistency of decisions and the equilibrium 
and as well the emotional impact on the decision maker. Participants 1, 2 and 4 are supporting 
that there is no direct answer with subject four stating that: 
                                                 
8 Participant 1: “[…] and I started to yell on the telephone, and I hit my table. If I'm wearing shoes from another senior 
executive or from another senior guy watching me proceeding like this, behaving like this, I would consider that this guy that 
is behaving like is very immature.” 
9 Participant 5: “[…] Yes, I faced in my job, a situation that was unhealthy, we couldn't obtain the performance and the proper 
statistics in a particular project that I was handling, due to the fact that some people who were related to this project did not 
do their job properly. Not only they did not do their job properly, but they were trying to do it - they were also trying to hurt 
the work of their colleagues. To present their colleagues as incompetent, inappropriate and to sabotage the work of others. 
There was a difficult situation I had to deal with, because we are talking about people who were in the company for a long 
time, they had their connections that they believed would protect them and of course it was a difficult situation for me, because 
it was a double-edged knife, because i could get exposed and dismissed, in case I did not achieved what I expected. Depends, 
of course, on what everyone believes, I decided that it should be done, it has to be done regardless of consequences and 
outcomes, I handled the case, I spoke in front of our managers, I told my opinion exposing my name, officially, something that 
has never been done before, I said that this should be done with this particular way, that this person makes the situation 
difficult, and should be removed from the specific project, that I think that the best thing we have to do is this, in order to get 
the results we wanted to. Fortunately, of course, not as easy as it seems now that we are discussing it, we finally ended up 
following my proposal, and the results were spectacular” 
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 “Not directly. Prefer not to answer. Too complicated, prefer not to answer, sorry” while 
manger 2 supports: 
 “Non-directly, yes. There is no guidance. there's this some information that is provided 
to all the employees about how they should behave in certain situation, et cetera”.  
Whereas participant 3 presents a different angle in this matter “No, it’s directly given 
for me. Specific guidance, that you're taught when you start in any industry how to do things 
and the rules of how you do things10 […]. There is a set of moral guidance and rules which 
aren’t written down, which is some of them are black and white trading laws. […] 11There 
needs to be a lot of honesty, otherwise, you can't work. If you can't work, you can't make money. 
If you can't make money, then no one gets a job. It's pretty straightforward.”  
 
To summarize this aspect reveals that for the majority of the subjects there is no direct 
guidance regarding the ethical requirements of a decision and even if there is, it is part of an 
unwritten law that it can be communicated or not. The latter, confirms the linkage of authority 
bias and ethical erosion as non-guidance can lead to acceptance of events as they appear. 
Hence, leading to slippery slope fallacy. Moreover, it poses various dilemmas as the individual 
waive the borders of ethicality.  
In the analysis they are identified various ethical dilemmas because the organizational 
context led in questioning the levels of trust and the ethical processes that one follows.  Or even 
questioning their actions that can be characterized as not ethical, thus they posed the subject 
into a dilemma though on parallel the outcome of the actions were actually justified as right by 
the company itself.  
Specifically, regarding the first variant manger 5 explains that “There were people in 
my workplace who promoted certain people and some other people did not promote them at 
all, that is, they did not give them an opportunity, or they created obstacles 12[..] There could 
be a dilemma, to intervene or not.” 13 whereas participant 4 adds “saying bye-bye to an employee 
                                                 
10 Participant 3: “The industry has an unwritten code of how to work. It's basically a trading environment. There is the right 
way to do it and the wrong way to do it. The wrong way to do it, you don't get very far at all, and the right way to do it you 
can be successful. Throughout my career, I have learned the correct way. I've seen the pitfalls, I've seen the wrong way, and 
I've chosen the correct way of buying and selling products Our company, we have handbooks for staff, we have procedural 
policy, whistle-blowing policies, we have conflict of interest policies. We have policies for driving vehicles, with van and 
mobiles. It's all meant to protect the employer as well as in protect the employee, but a lot of people, if you give them many 
handbooks, people just don't read them” 
11 Participant 3: “Verbally you buy. Contractually you buy. Yes, there is a set of rules, and in order to operate ethically within 
our industry, there needs to be trust. There needs to be a level of honesty.” 
12 Participant 5: “In my view, the people who were promoted did not have the skills, or they had far less skills than those who 
were neither promoted or were prevented.” 
13 Participant 5: “For me there was no moral dilemma. I intervene - in my opinion this ought to be done, I have defended people 
who should get the opportunity, people who offer work, offer to the company, really offer to the world, these people must take 
opportunities and should be helped to evolve and they get better and do the job better, so I have to confront and fight the so-
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it's very painful, but also making our job losing money because of this is painful as well. This 
is a very complicated type of dilemma.”.  
 
In the second variant where the subject actually passed the ethical limits though as it 
was mentioned earlier, the action was justified by the company and actually rewarded – 
participant 2 states14 that authority bias and the need to comply to his company’s objectives 
coerce to profit from an unethical behavior. Again it evident than an authority’s unfair 
objectives lead to an ethical dilemma on exposing one’s self to a corrupted action. Another 
evidence that authority bias may lead to gradual ethical erosion as personal beliefs are altered 
in the demand of an authority’s beliefs. 
In the last category the participants were asked to reflect on positive outcomes. In other 
words, if a positive outcome is able to bias their or others moral immunity. Participant 2 
responded that: 
 “I think people would bend the rules a little I guess. If there is a positive outcome of 
bending the rules” and participant 5 supports the same view that : 
“Of course. It has happened several times, […] to see people who, when they acquire 
a particular position, change completely. They change their moral code, change their behavior, 
change their attitude, change everything due to some positive outcomes” 15 
 
This last statement as all the statements analyzed by category are leading to the 
confirmation that authority bias may lead to gradual ethical erosion. Therefore, the last linkage: 
The authority bias and consequently procedural (in)justice may lead to gradual ethical erosion 
                                                 
called system, because it is a subsystem of the system, that is, it is a very small group of people who due to the fact that they 
have power in their hands, they can do damage to careers. To destroy people, block people or promote people who are not 
suitable and appropriate for these positions. There was no moral dilemma, basically. There could be, I could say that i did not 
see, I could contribute to this, and to join the system like I saw happening. I could do the same to some people whom I would 
have more sympathy and to reject some other people who while they are capable, do not flatter me, do not belong to my 
favorite people - something like that. No, my decision was to do so, I know that my career would had been much easier, would 
grow much faster, I would have been promoted much faster on the company, but I decided to do the opposite. What I thought 
was right. To go against the system, talk about people who are worth the effort to evolve, to take a stand about unhealthy 
situations, the way they work, and to move on in the way that I think is the most appropriate one.” 
14 Participant 2: “I remember that years ago I was visiting a guide and I found a binder with a lot of information from a 
competitor, it turns out that another company had visited at the same time and they had left a whole bunch of sensitive 
information that would have been very interesting for us to learn about. My boss wanted them so instead of making our guide 
aware of this, I got the opportunity to learn all this valuable data. And my company was quiet happy with this, though I regret”.  
15 Participant 5: “In my opinion, the important reasons are two or three. First, they feel - deep inside them they know that for 
the particular position they occupy, they have not the appropriate qualifications - in fact they are not qualified, they are 
incomplete and precisely because they want to keep the new position they took, necessarily or with a purpose, they approach 
the people with power, namely their line manager or the one who hired them or the team that put them in that position, they 
become, consciously or unconsciously, the tools of these people and the humiliation of these people and pawns of their desire 
and their goals, in order to be able to keep the position they have acquired and which they know deeply that they have obtained 
it without having the proper qualifications.”  
 
 61 
is valid and confirmed. It is observed that low levels of procedural (in)justice can increase 
substantially slippery slope fallacy unconsciously or consciously or even with complete 
awareness of doing. Moreover, individuals exposed in contexts of low procedural justice 
imposed by an authority figure, they face increasingly more moral dilemmas than if the things 
were presented differently. 
In a similar way, the Yukos/Khodorkovsky example presented on chapter 3 can be 
justified by the latter linkage. Khodorkovsky’s authority figure created clear lack of fair 
processes. His unethical behavior posed pressure to the managers and left no gap of doubt for 
his actions instead promoted such behaviors from his employees. The impact of such authority 
figure on managers is significantly relevant to unethical behaviors. As seen from Yukos 
paradigm cases of complete ethical erosion came with Khodorkovsky’s criminal cases. It is 
therefore evident that an authority figure who acts in corrupted ways is able to lead to ethical 
dilemmas that can be fatal for manager’s values and beliefs.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusions and implications  
 
This study confirms the linkages that were drawn from psychological traps and 
authority bias in relation to the processes of bounded ethicality. As seen in the analysis of the 
findings these traps depend on various external and internal conditions. Building on this logic, 
this study has extended the institutional framework of managerial ethical decision making. As 
it identified new linkages on the cases of bounded ethicality and on the concepts of 
psychological traps and authority bias that can lead to unethical decisions. 
Namely, the linkages are confirming that the more people are exposed to each of the 
examined traps the more likely to fall under the cases of bounded ethicality. More precisely it 
was observed that: 
➢ Sunk cost trap and cognitive ethical dissonance:  
The more the participants are holding on a past situation more likely to profit from 
unethical behavior and from her/his aspiration to uphold a certain ethical self-image. 
➢ Anchoring trap and ethical uncertainty:  
The participants that moved around a certain anchor in their answers they felt under the 
description of the action and the compulsory “oughts” they need to fulfil. 
➢ Framing trap and implicit ethical attitudes:  
Participants that are subjected to framed bias are likely to generate automatically 
stereotypes. 
➢ Status quo trap and egocentrism:  
Participants that are attracted to the current state of affairs and do not want to change 
this state are likely to have short terms incentives and act in an egocentric, self-interested way.  
➢ Authority bias (procedural in-justice) and ethical erosion:  
Participants that comply to an authority’s (company) unfair processes are being 
exposed to situations that promoted unethical behaviors and dilemmas.  
 
 It is worth noting that the authority bias, under lack of procedural justice, may lead 
gradually to apathy as seen from participants 1,2 and 4 as they become less sensitive to moral 
violations when these occur repeatedly in their work unit.  
It is also demonstrated that the cognitive pitfalls might grow gradually depending on 
the choices of the individual though they are not occurred abruptly.  
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6.1 Contributions and Managerial implications 
 
This part aims to present the general contributions and implications of this research. 
The main goal is to suggest techniques which middle managers can use in order to become 
firstly aware of each trap and then try to avoid them. On a second level, certain tools are 
presented that top management and executives can use to create a productive decision-making 
culture as well as to protect their organizational ethos.    
In order to do so, recommendations are derived from the participants’ insightful 
experiences. Moreover, these suggestions are aligned with existing theories that present similar 
ideas. The aim is to formulate techniques to avoid each of the examined traps individuals and 
to present tools that top management can make use to control on certain degree theses 
distortions. 
The present research contributes to the behavioral management and business ethics 
fields, particularly behavioral traps and managerial ethical decision making, by moving beyond 
the narrow focus of the rational approach and discovering important antecedents of ethical 
decision making by incorporating behavioral traps. As such, the findings of this study have 
several important implications.  
Most of the managers have the belief that they are ethical individuals and they do not 
engage in unethical behavior not even exposed to it as seen from the research. Therefore, most 
of them they question why should they spent time on taking lessons on how they will behave 
ethically. Though the concepts presented in this research highlight that ethical concerns are 
likely to have escaped from the attention of honest and dishonest managers as seen on the 
findings. In fact, the majority of the participants are subjected to unseen biases that increase 
unethical behavior. Therefore, the general implication of this study is provide an insight on the 
decision making processes from a different angle and thus to foresee which biases can lead to 
unethical choices.  That can help organization to focus on the psychological tendencies in order 
to improve individual and organizational ethics.  
Another notable domain in which the psychological linkages will be echoed is in 
managerial’ attributions. Logically, managers – and particularly middle ones – of firms that 
are subjected to these linkages, would be accorded less importance than others, simply because 
they are seen as having a smaller effect on firms’ outcomes as well as consistency of these 
outcomes on ethical level. As such, an important implication of the acknowledgment of such 
biases would let top managers to assist middle managers’ gullibility on these biases.  
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 Moreover, it is fair to state that due to the privileged position that middle management 
offers as well as all the personal characteristics required, a far greater level of responsibility is 
actually compulsory. Thus, it is imperative to recognize that middle managers could considered 
and be mindful of the biases that are examined for implementing transformational changes 
rather than the ethical apathy that was observed as their position is increasingly demanding. In 
other words, vigilance is a main diver of conscious ethical decision making processes and the 
lack of it activates the biases and consequently unethical behaviors   (Banaji et al., 2003).  
 
Improving individual decision making 
When it comes to practical managerial techniques in order to avoid these biases it is 
provided below a list of techniques that can reduce the impact of each concept of psychological 
trap. 
Anchoring: 
➢ It is important to seek information from a variety of sources that might be 
outside the work unit or the working team in order to broaden the reference 
point from which a solution of a problem starts. 
➢ Sharing too much information on the estimations and the ideas and tentative 
decisions can anchor the individuals that are in the department. Being mindful 
to whom managers solicit information is crucial. 
➢ When a problem is initially presented it is better to start by processing it 
privately before ask consultation because at the beginning it will be easy to be 
anchored by others.  
➢ Relevant to the previous technique when examining privately a problem it is 
important to use several starting points rather than staying on the first line of 
the thoughts that occur as it seen that the participants are spontaneous in their 
reactions.  
 
Status quo: To start, maintaining the current state of affairs sometimes can be the best 
alternative as seen from the participants, though choosing not to change this, because simply it 
provides comfort, needs to be avoided.  
➢ It is important not to overestimate the cost on shifting from the current state of 
affairs and exaggerate on effort if the status quo needs to change. 
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➢ Filtering again personal objectives sometimes might be important, even if 
egocentrism is enhanced by status quo, because maybe the status quo is 
incompatible with personal beliefs. 
➢ Considering status quo as non-existed and taking it as an alternative can actually 
reveal the pitfalls of it. Simply, setting a status quo default would just increase the 
effect of egocentrism and thus lead to more unethical decisions.  
 
Sunk cost: consciously it is vital to set aside any sunk costs because they will simply 
escalate the problem and as it was proved managers can end up profiting from unethical 
decisions. 
➢ It is important for managers, as participant 5 stated, not to stop their activity but 
if it had bad consequence that by admitting it injures their self-image it is vital for 
them to admit why these decisions distress them and deal with it rather than 
escalating it.  
➢ Moreover, it is important for managers to make judgement explicit part for each 
decision and not wait to second guested by others. Thus, consider how to 
argument for a choice. 
➢ It is important also to seek individuals that are not committed or involved in a 
decision, as different arguments can reduce the sunk cost fallacy. 
 
Framing: the framed bias can undermine any kind of choice as it was confirmed that 
automatically increases stereotyped categorizations and judgements that can lead to unethical 
options. 
➢ As derived by participant 5 it is important to not automatically accept initial 
frame. Looking for distortions than simply accept will reduce the effect. 
➢ Part of reframing is for a manger to be neutral and combine in the changes both 
gains and losses rather than stick to how the problem was firstly framed. 
➢ Subordinates in the work unit might work on financial results, it is important to 
yield profit for the company though foresee the long-run effects is part of the 
role of middle managers and thus challenge the problem through various frames.  
➢ It is vital as well individually and by the organization to remind constantly the 
fundamental objectives, written and unwritten as subject 3 supported, to make 
sure that the way that managers frame the problem to advance the objectives.  
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Authority bias was linked in the analysis with procedural (in)justice exposing managers 
to unethical behaviors. Two primary ways to reduce the effect is: 
➢ Managers should establish their own credibility and demonstrate it inside their 
teams to avoid misconceptions. Subject 5 sacrificed her position to do so and she 
did not simply accept unethical processes. Hence, she achieved to formulate and 
to provide changes. 
➢ Lastly, a third-party authority might increase the credibility of the processes or 
the choices. Demonstrating this figure will decrease the personal and in-group 
ethical dilemmas.  
 
Improving organizational tools 
 On the company level, the main tools that are suggested in the present research should 
focus not on codes of ethics, which are present to all participants’ companies, rather than to 
certain indirect goals that can help to reduce the traps.  
Taking under consideration that all participants in this research are exposed to the traps 
and are easily misinterpreting the true issues that they face, executives should consider two 
main goals: 
 - identify and measure the degree of the company’s vulnerability to human error 
 - determine the real issues  
 In order to achieve the latter goals and after they pass the diagnostic process, executives 
can make use of various tools to reduce the effect of the traps and their outcome on the ethical 
image of the company.  
➢ The company can keep track of middle managers’ expectations against current 
decision outcomes in order to isolate the central processes of decision making. 
Avoid framing biases and thus implicit ethical behaviors: 
o To receive deep business outcomes companies can make use of periodic 
testing of IAT for measuring implicit ethical behaviors. 
o Additionally, short and simple periodic ethics survey can be used in 
order to identify misconducts. Managers should be asked whether they 
observed misconduct, if they managed to report it and if not why they 
failed to do it and lastly, if they were pleased from how the problem was 
resolved. The results should be published in each business unit. 
o Lastly, internal peer review of two or three officers from other business 
units can be used in order to track how central decision making 
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processes differ and why and utilize this as a training tool and as a 
reminder of fundamental principles. The results should be also 
published in the web page.  
➢ Moreover, executives could make use of an independent opinion on initial 
assessments of key decisions. They could assign crucial problems to an external 
committee. The latter tool can reduce any emotional attachment to the process 
of decision making and thus avoid sunk-cost trap and cases of cognitive ethical 
dissonance.  
o Designation Ethics Committee of external consultants that can identify 
conflicts of interest and they will disclose any misconduct. 
➢ Mid-level managers, as it is seen for the participants, they are assigned with a 
smaller or moderate risk, thus companies might set different criteria that are 
more tolerant and thus help to reduce push factors that can lead to the traps. As 
it was observed the higher the pressure on the outcome of the projects the bigger 
the effect of the anchoring trap and ethical uncertainty. 
o Sentencing Guidelines based on the following criteria: the procedures 
that managers face, the training that they received so far, their 
compliance to the ethics programs, their reporting attitude and their team 
effectiveness. 
o Helpline Reporting System to reduce concerns regarding ethics issues 
and also report anonymously wrongdoing. The latter can facilitate the 
formulation of correct anchors for future decisions.  
➢ Most of the participants, that were subjected to the biases and thus more likely 
to make unethical choices, were highly paid comparing to those that were less 
prone to the biases. It can be argued that top management should pay attention 
to these individuals as they tend to behave above the rules in order to maintain 
their short term wealth at the expense of long term corporate health. To avoid 
the latter status quo fallacy and consequently egocentrism that derives from 
money, these issues can be addressed by: 
o  “Balanced scorecards” taking under consideration both short-term 
performance and long term decisions.  
➢ Executives should request from middle managers the “next-based” ideas that 
include any possible alternative that can reveal opportunities. It is observed a 
default manner on presenting ideas based on the pressure that an authority senior 
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manager sets. The latter can be fatal for the robust effect of authority bias and 
consequently lead to gradual ethical erosion. 
o Use of a Business Conduct Steering Committee consisted by senior 
executives from major business areas (Sears, 2006). This Committee can 
request and review ideas and initiatives as well underline emerging gaps 
on the results of them. Their role is to make accurate public disclosures 
in order to maintain the level of fairness and act as a third authority 
figure between senior and mid-level managers. That is to enhance that 
idea that processes are properly executed. 
 
The above tools might be useful in case the organization has a culture that can support 
them, otherwise the effectiveness of them cannot be guaranteed. In order to achieve this and 
based on the participants’ insights it can be proposed that the company should: 
I. Create a non-confrontational process that can make all management levels to challenge 
their peers. A method could be to set a mid-level seminar in which individuals can 
advocate another’s strategy.  
II. Focus on collectively reflect on past decisions and mistakes. Mid-level managers 
should capture that such a debate is useful in order to learn from their mistakes and not 
to avoid or hide them.  
III. And lastly, appointment of Chief Business Officers that can monitor these processes as 
other major companies did such as Dell and Texas Instruments (Fombrun & Foss, 
2004).  
To summarize, the present research and the suggested techniques and tools on individual 
and organizational level are as vital as any other strategic tool. Organizations cannot bear to 
disregard the psychological traps in the process of ethical decision making. Top management 
should establish a culture that offers the necessary space for a constructive debate if companies 
aim to avoid any harm on their organizational ethos.  
 
6.2 Future research 
 
An idea for future research is the diffusion of these traps and the development of 
hypothesis that can test their overlapping tendencies.  It can be observed from the interviews 
that many of the traps are interdependent, such as framing with status quo and anchoring or 
status quo with sunk costs. Consequently, explore and quantify the manifestations of these 
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relationships on the conceptualized framework of bounded ethicality might expand the existing 
theory into new directions. The task implemented in this research can be an example of how 
behavioral errors not solely lead to erroneous general decision making but are components that 
can increase moral pitfalls.  
Future research might also diffuse procedural justice as a third variable and how this 
creates linkages with the traps – it was observed that procedural justice might have even bigger 
contribution to psychological traps than it was examined in this study – and how this manifests 
in each construct of ethicality.  
To summarize, it is recommended to future researches to investigate these 
manifestations of behavioral traps as well as potential anchors, such as lack of procedural 
justice, to demonstrate the moral lock-in effect. While other traps may also play a role in 
enhancing the contrasts of bounded ethicality, the findings strongly exhibit that anchoring, 
framing, status quo, suck cost and authority bias are a prominent conceptual fulcrum that affect 
the moral process and outcome of decisions. By uncovering this relationship, this study was 
able to identify an important linkage by which the latter elements impact decision making 
performance. 
Understanding how behavioral traps function on ethical level remains an under-
researched topic in the literature. Though this thesis represents an attempt to address this gap, 
there are several avenues for future research to consider. A greater understanding of the 
antecedents, consequences and the role psychological traps that play at the ethical-level, sheds 
fresh lights on the differences in managerial practices and the transferability/generalizability 
of these practices. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1 
 
List of topics Interview question format  
General background and 
procedural justice 
 
a. Can you tell me a little bit about yourself and your current 
job? 
b. What do you remember about what first attracted you to get 
involved? What was the role of the organizational structure 
in this decision? (probe on procedural justice) 
c. In a scale between 1 to 5 how would you evaluate the justice 
in the procedures of your company? / previous working 
experience / close working environment? 
d. What are some of the activities/roles that they are 
performing often/on a daily basis? 
e. Could you tell me about the steps or process you typically 
use to make decisions on a daily basis? 
Decision Making Process 
 
a. Let’s talk about a specific decision in some depth. Can you 
tell me about a decision that was particularly difficult for 
you to make at work in the past year? Describe the issue 
b. What made this decision difficult for you? 
c.  What did you do to make the decision? 
 
a. Anchoring 
trap 
 
a. Do you usually stick on the first line of thoughts that occur 
to you when a problem arrives in your hands? 
b. Do you examine a problem first by your own before 
consulting others? 
c. Do you seek opinions on all levels and use a variety of 
people as a reference to your decisions? 
d. When counselling or communicating your ideas or 
estimations do you give as much information as possible or 
not as much? 
e. Consider that you have an estimation for a given issue that 
requires your decision, would you consider the extremes? 
(If yes, why?) 
b. Status quo 
trap 
 
a. When elements of a current problem that need your 
immediate decision are incompatible with the objectives of 
your position and your role in the company, how you 
manage to serve both requirements? 
b. If a well-defined situation/choice provides comfort to the 
company and to your role are you still going to think of an 
alternative? (If yes, how do you identify the 
counterbalances?) 
c. Coming back to the previous question, would you force 
yourself to identify the best option for your decisions or you 
would most likely stick to what you current status quo offers 
you? 
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c. Framing 
trap 
 
a. When a problem arrives to you would you reframe it? Why? 
b. If a problem is posed in terms of gains would you take a 
risk? Why? 
c. If the problem is presented to you in terms of losses what is 
more likely to happen?  
d. Imagine that your subordinates examine possible decisions 
on given problem emphasizing on the broader financial 
impact of the decision? How would you examine this? What 
would be your contribution? 
e. Regarding your motives: would you support that gathering 
information is one of your tactics or look for evidence that 
support what you think is more likely to happen? 
d. Sunk cost 
trap 
 
a. When you find yourself in a hole, are you going to stop 
digging or keep it going? 
b. Do you consider in your decision making process that 
criticism is an explicit consequence of it, do you keep in 
mind how would you explain a decision of yours to others if 
needed? 
c. Having a person or more to play devils’ advocate builds 
better reasoning for your decisions? (If yes, why?) 
d. Would you support that you seek information that comforts 
your instincts regarding a decision or not at all and why? 
Challenging decision 
making related to ethics at 
workplace and procedural 
justice 
 
a. Have you had to make any difficult ethical decisions? Can 
you tell me about the process you used for that?  
b. What made this decision difficult for you? 
c. Can you tell me more about what happened related to the 
decision? What was asked of you? What did you feel was 
expected of you? Did you get anyone else involved? Can 
you tell me more about that? 
d. Are positive outcomes able to bias your or others moral 
immunity? 
e. Should managers consider three questions when taking 
decisions: Is it legal? Is it balanced? How will it make me feel 
about myself?  
f. Do you feel that the organizational structure of your company 
allows you to do these questions?  
g. Should organizations simply set aspirational ethical values?  
h. Would such an approach benefit your job?  
i. How important would you say procedural justice is to you 
right now? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 77 
Table 2 
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
 
 
My name is Nikolaos Vavdinos. I am a student/researcher at GSOM Graduate School of 
Management. My contact information and that of the professor who is supervising this work is 
provided below. If you have any questions about this ethics review process or substance of the 
research please feel free to contact my professor Maxim Storchevoi, email: 
storchevoy@gsom.pu.ru, for clarification. 
Nikolaos Vavdinos, email: nikolasvavdinos@gmail.com Phone number: +7xxxxxxxxxx 
 
I am exploring decision making processes and I am interested in business ethics.  
 
I am therefore asking if you would agree to participate in my research by answering a series of 
questions that will be taped and/or recorded.  
 
If you feel uncomfortable or concerned about this interview, please let me know and we can 
either not continue with the interview or reschedule at a time that is more appropriate. 
 
Please understand that you do not have to participate in this research, and that you can terminate 
your participation at any time during the course of the interview. Also feel free to skip any 
particular question and move on the next one at any time during the research.  
 
If you agree, I will record our conversation to facilitate my data collection and future analysis. 
This research is confidential and no individuals or organizations will be identified without their 
written consent. Any information that could reveal your identity or that of your organization 
will be excluded from any future papers or research reports that are written based on this 
research.  
 
Participant: 
I am fully aware of the nature and extent of my participation in this project as stated above 
and the possible risks from it.  I hereby agree to participate in this project.  I acknowledge that 
I have received a copy of this consent statement. 
 
________________________________  ______________________ 
Signature of participant    Date 
 
________________________________  ______________________________ 
 
 
